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Economic Impact Assessment of Bovine Tuberculosis in the South 
West of England 
Summary 
1. Introduction 
Bovine TB (bTB) presents a significant challenge to beef and dairy farmers. In 2009 
7,449 herds were subject to movement restrictions in Great Britain because of bTB. 
Of these, 52% were in South West England and 20% were in Devon alone. With 
over 25% of holdings with cattle in the South West likely to suffer a bTB breakdown 
within the course of a year, understanding the cost implications on farm businesses 
is vital in order to demonstrate the impact that this disease is having on agricultural 
communities and the agricultural economy.  
This report describes the burden of these costs based on case study interviews with 
South West farmers and telephone interviews with key individuals in the agricultural 
industry in the region.  
The overall aims of this research were: 
1. To illustrate through detailed farm case studies the economic impact of 
Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) on agricultural businesses in the South West. 
2.  To consider the economic impact of Bovine Tuberculosis to the wider rural 
industry and community – such as vets, livestock markets and others. 
The specific objectives of the research were: 
  To examine the economic impact on agricultural businesses in terms of 
identifying  
o  (i) costs associated with bTB testing and  
o  (ii) production costs associated with the breakdown itself, including the 
role that compensation and insurance payments have in mitigating 
these.  
  To consider the economic impact of bTB on the wider community and 
industry.  
A case study methodology was employed to enable an in-depth examination of the 
economic impact of bTB on dairy and beef farms. In late March and early April 2010, 
eight in-depth interviews were conducted with farmers that had recently endured or 
were still enduring a bTB breakdown and these form the basis of the case study 
analysis. The case study farms were selected to represent a range of different  
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farming attributes (see main report). In addition, the extent of the breakdowns 
between the case studies illustrates how some farms spend many years under bTB 
restrictions, while for others the breakdown lasted less than a year.  
The case study approach provides detailed evidence of the economic impact of bTB 
on SW farms. The analysis however, does have its limitations. Given the restricted 
number of observations, it is not possible to make statements or predictions 
about the role of bTB in the whole of the SW farming economy. This study has 
been informed by the earlier study of the economic impact of bTB by Sheppard and 
Turner. However, differences in methodological approach between the two studies 
and changes in the compensation system mean that it is not possible to make 
comparisons between the two sets of results. 
2. The total cost of bTB on case study farms 
The monthly loss of a bTB breakdown varies considerably from just under £505 to 
nearly £3,184. Clearly, there are many factors that account for the range of losses 
including the type of farm, the scale of operation, restocking policy, area farmed, 
number of holdings away from the farmstead, the marketing of livestock and 
livestock produce and by how much this is restricted. In general, but not exclusively, 
dairy farms tend to accrue the greatest losses during a bTB breakdown.  
It is important to recognise that the costs of bTB ripple out across the businesses 
impacting on labour, feed and bedding costs, creating animal welfare issues and 
causing unintended contraventions of regulations such as organic certification 
requirements and cross-compliance. Furthermore, bTB also has implications for the 
well-being of farmers and their families as well as for the wider economy and 
community.  
3. The cost of bTB testing 
The approximate cost of administering and reading the intradermal tuberculin (skin) 
test per animal over each test and the breakdown period varied considerably. For 
example, the lowest was £1.36 and the highest was £6.10, although most were 
between £1.95 and £2.97 per animal. There were no discernible differences between 
beef and dairy farms. However, there are also a range of indirect and often hidden 
costs associated with testing such as the knock-on impacts on other activities (e.g. 
delays to silage making), impacts on milk production (although not all farmers 
experience this), behavioural difficulties in cattle and additional fuel and (human) 
feed costs. 
4. The cost of movement restrictions 
The costs of keeping additional stock accrue in costs for extra bedding, feed and 
labour to keep stock on the farm. The inability to move stock off-farm (or around a 
farm for those businesses composed of more than one holding) creates a  
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significantly increased workload and may also be associated with problems of over-
stocking and unintentional breaches of organic certification and cross-compliance 
regulations.  
The costs of movement restrictions reflect the individual characteristics of particular 
farm businesses, the spatial configuration of the land holdings, the specific features 
of the farm enterprises, etc, suggesting that average figures can mask much of the 
complexity of cost assessment. The estimated costs of movement restrictions 
ranged from £3,198 to over £55,000 per farm. 
5. The cost of replacement livestock 
The costs associated with replacing stock vary considerably, and the practicalities of 
replacing stock can have wider impacts on herd management and the farm business. 
In addition to the direct cost of the livestock itself, the costs of sourcing replacement 
stock include labour time taken to source cattle, the cost of travelling to see stock, 
and the costs of haulage once the cattle are purchased. These additional costs 
varied from just £43 for one farm to £985 for another.  
The ability to replace livestock may in part depend on the amount of compensation 
received. Due to the variability of compensation payments and the mismatch 
between compensation payments and market values (see below), not all farms can 
afford to replace all cattle slaughtered. For instance, one farm only received 
sufficient compensation to replace just over 50% of their dairy cattle that had been 
slaughtered. In turn, this was associated with a significant loss of revenue from 
reduced milk sales. Not all farmers buy-in replacements. Some have chosen to 
maintain a closed herd and breed their own replacements. Again, this can be 
associated with a significant loss of milk revenue.  
6. Compensation and insurance payments 
The present bTB compensation scheme (introduced in February 2006) is derived 
from sale data obtained from store markets, prime markets, rearing calf sales, 
breeding sales and dispersal sales in Great Britain, rather than individual animal 
valuations. As such, farmers that breed and manage high value stock (whether these 
are pedigree or not) are likely to be under compensated, whereas farmers with cattle 
perceived in the market place to be of lower than average quality (as expressed in 
terms of price) are likely to be over compensated.  
Evidence from the case study farms suggests that the chart-based compensation 
system fails to reflect the perceived value of stock. One farmer described it as 
‘inadequate’ and ‘farcical’ given the time spent in breeding specific bloodlines to 
improve the quality of animals and their production performance. Consequently, for 
producers of high value pedigree, commercial or organic stock, a low rate of 
compensation can lead to difficulty in finding the same calibre replacement stock.   
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In terms of insurance, claims per cow ranged from £150 to £300. The excess limit on 
the number of cattle that can be claimed for varied from having no exemption to an 
exemption on the first six animals of any claim. 
7. The longer term costs of bTB 
There are numerous longer-term costs of bTB that impact upon farm businesses. 
Some were directly related to dealing with the demands of the disease, such as 
additional paperwork or financing biosecurity measures, while others are structural, 
including the extension of overdrafts or the postponement of capital investment. 
However, the longer term effects of farming under bTB restrictions are difficult to 
quantify accurately since business decisions are undertaken for a variety of reasons. 
While the disease may have a considerable influence, it is unlikely to be the only 
factor in the equation. Nevertheless, this report demonstrates that bTB frequently 
influences decision-making and in some instances acts as a ‘tipping point’ which 
precipitates change in the business. 
8. Personal and social costs 
Although the focus of this study was on economic impacts, it has illustrated the 
stress and upset that bTB can bring to the farming industry through illuminating how 
the disease can change, significantly, the way a farm operates, as well as the 
additional workload that movement restrictions bring. There is the feeling of 
helplessness in the management of the disease, with farmers feeling like 
‘bystanders’, which is deeply upsetting for many farmers and their families, for whom 
breeding cattle is more than just a business.  
9. The impact of bTB on wider economy 
The perspectives offered by interviewees from businesses associated with 
agriculture that have experience of bTB suggest that the disease has had costs but 
has also offered opportunities. However, where opportunities have arisen, these are 
often identified as being in conflict with the wider aspirations of business 
development. For example, while the vets may benefit from increased trade, they 
recognise that this is at the cost of developing better animal health programmes 
alongside farmers.  
In addition, responses from businesses in the wider economy support farmers’ 
comments regarding difficulties in sourcing good quality livestock in the South West, 
the inadequacies of the compensation system and the consequences of the disease 
on farm animal health programmes. 
10. Conclusions 
Leaving aside the heated debate about appropriate means for controlling the 
incidence and geographical spread of bTB, this report has shown that current  
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compensation payments tend not to fully compensate farmers for their direct and 
indirect economic losses. The research undertaken for this report has revealed 
considerable variation across a range of different types of costs associated with bTB. 
Consequently average figures, either for costs or calculating compensation, obscure 
much of the detail at an individual farm level. The research also points to a range of 
‘hidden’ and longer term costs that fall beyond the scope of the compensation 
scheme. Finally, in addition to economic losses, bTB is imposing considerable costs 
on the personal well-being of many farm households and also raises profound 
livestock welfare issues.   
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Economic Impact Assessment of Bovine Tuberculosis in the South 
West of England 
 
1. Introduction 
In Great Britain between 1996 and the beginning of 2010, the number of herds under 
movement restrictions because of a bovine TB (bTB) breakdown increased from 649 
to a seasonal peak of 4,590 in April 2009 (see Figure 1). Over this period, there has 
been a fivefold increase in herds under movement restrictions, thus increasing the 
burden of costs on farmers’ and the government. It is estimated that between 
1999/00 and 2008/09 the costs of bTB to the British Government was £458 million 
(Defra 2010a).
1 
This report describes the burden of these costs based on case study interviews with 
South West farmers and telephone interviews with key individuals in the agricultural 
industry in the region.  
The overall aims of this research were: 
  To illustrate through detailed farm case studies the economic impact of 
Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) on agricultural businesses in the South West 
(Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Dorset, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire). 
  To consider the economic impact of Bovine Tuberculosis to the wider rural 
industry and community – such as vets, livestock markets and others. 
In order to achieve these aims, the specific objectives of the research were to 
examine the economic impact on agricultural businesses in terms of identifying (i) 
costs associated with bTB testing and (ii) production costs associated with the 
breakdown itself, including the role that compensation and insurance payments have 
in mitigating these. A further objective was to consider the economic impact of bTB 
on the wider community and industry.  
2. Bovine Tuberculosis in the South West of England 
In 2009, there were 7,449 herds subject to movement restrictions in Great Britain 
because of bTB. Of these, 52% occurred in South West England and 20% were in 
Devon alone. Figure 2 illustrates the number of herds under movement restrictions in 
each county of South West England as a percentage of all herds under movement 
                                                 
1 It is not clear from the data whether this figure is £458 million or £603 million because the data in the columns for the 




restrictions in England. From this it is clear that Devon and Cornwall would seem to 
be particularly affected.  



























































** Data for 2001 are not comparable with other years. During the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, TB testing was 
significantly reduced and necessarily targeted to areas of higher risk (Defra 2010). 
* Data for 2002 are not comparable with other years. Testing resources were concentrated on herds which were overdue 
their tests (because of the backlog caused by the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak) (Defra 2010). 
Source: Defra (2010b) 
 
Figure 2: Herds under bTB restrictions in South West England as a percentage of 
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The data released by Defra gives the absolute number of farms and cattle affected 
by bTB. However, only considering absolute values (such as those presented by 
Figure 2) may mask the relative intensity of the disease in certain counties. Location 
Quotient (LQ) methodology provides an indication of the relative, rather than the 
absolute, spatial concentration of a phenomenon in a particular area by controlling 
for the varying size of counties and unitary authorities (CUA). LQ methodology has 
been used to explore the relative spatial concentration of organic farms (Ilbery and 
Maye 2010a) and it has also been used to explore agricultural tenancy patterns and 
the distribution of wheat and potatoes (Ilbery et al 2010; Ilbery and Maye 2010b).The 
calculation of the LQ is adapted from a method used by Ilbery et al. (1999): 
Number of farms with movement restrictions in CUA ‘x’ ÷ 
Number of farms with movement restrictions in England 
 
LQ ratio =  Number of farms in CUA ‘x’ ÷ 
Number of farms in England 
A LQ ratio of 1.0 signifies that an area has neither more nor less of its share of farms 
under bTB restrictions than its overall number of farms would suggest. Counties with 
an LQ ratio over 1.0 therefore have a greater relative spatial concentration (i.e. the 
incidence of farms with bTB restrictions is greater than that which might be 
expected). However, one weakness of the LQ ratio is its sensitivity to small numbers 
which can result in some of the smaller geographical units (metropolitan counties 
and unitary authorities) having to be treated with caution (Ilbery and Maye 2010a). 
Therefore, to ensure representativeness smaller urban authorities have been 
amalgamated with larger neighbouring counties.  
Table 1: Relative distribution of farms with bTB by number of holdings with cattle and 
cattle numbers 
  LQ (holdings with cattle)  LQ (cattle numbers) 
Avon 1.56  1.26 
Cornwall 2.41  2.13 
Devon 2.35  2.37 
Dorset 1.31  0.74 
Gloucestershire 3.26  3.58 
Somerset 1.14  0.82 
Wiltshire 1.73  1.49 
SW England  2.04  1.84 
Table 1 gives the LQ scores for the relative distribution of farms with bTB (by number 
of holdings with cattle and cattle numbers) whereas Table 2 ranks the LQ scores in 
order of relative spatial concentration. From this it is evident that all counties in the 
South West have a greater share of farms that are affected by bTB than would be 
expected. However, while Devon has the greatest absolute number of holdings 
under bTB restrictions (see Figure 2), Gloucestershire has a much greater relative 
concentration of bTB under movement restrictions given the size and number of 
farms in the county. Somerset, on the other hand, while ranked fourth in terms of 
absolute number of holdings under bTB movement restrictions, has the lowest 
relative concentration of farms with bTB restrictions in the South West region,  
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although this is still a greater relative spatial concentration than may be expected. In 
terms of cattle slaughtered, Gloucestershire has the most slaughtered cattle relative 
to the number of cattle in the county, followed by Devon. Interestingly, Somerset and 
Dorset have a lower relative spatial concentration than might be expected. One 
explanation for this is that on holdings in these counties relatively fewer cows per 
herd are identified as reactors.  
Table 2: Ranking of LQ scores for farms with bTB by number of holdings with cattle 
(absolute ranking in brackets) and cattle slaughtered  
  LQ (holdings with cattle)  LQ (cattle slaughtered) 
Gloucestershire 1  (3)  1 
Cornwall 2  (2)  3 
Devon 3  (1)  2 
Wiltshire 4  (5)  4 
Avon 5  (7)  5 
Dorset 6  (6)  7 
Somerset 7  (4) 6 
It is against this backdrop that this study of the costs of bTB is set. With over one-
quarter of holdings with cattle in the South West likely to suffer a bTB breakdown 
within the course of a year, understanding the cost implications on farm businesses 
demonstrates the impact that this disease is having on agricultural communities and 
the agricultural economy. 
3. Methodology 
In order to meet the objectives of this study, a case study methodology has been 
employed that enables an in-depth examination of the economic impact of bTB on 
dairy and beef farms. By focusing on individual examples, in-depth analysis provides 
a better understanding of the system as a whole (Gerring 2007). This approach is 
particularly suitable when examining the many difficulties and challenges to farming 
families and their businesses associated with bTB. The detailed case study 
approach therefore develops a rich mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
regarding the economic impact of TB on the SW farming economy.  
A case study analysis however does have its limitations. Given the restricted number 
of observations, it is not possible to make statements or predictions about the 
role of bTB in the whole of the SW farming economy. Furthermore, it is not 
possible to presume that what occurs on one farm will happen on other farms. 
Indeed, case studies are unique and not transferable. To be able to make inferences 
about economic data relating to bTB on farms would require a large scale survey of 
SW farmers which was beyond the resources of this project.  
In order to illustrate a range of farm enterprise characteristics in addressing the 
objective of how bTB influences upon different types of farm businesses, it was 
necessary to select farms that had more than one business/enterprise attribute. 
Table 3 illustrates the criteria for choosing farms as case study examples. For  
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example, an organic dairy farm may be owner-occupied, process non-pasteurized 
milk and have a pedigree beef herd. Alternatively, a conventional dairy farm may be 
wholly rented, have a calf rearing enterprise and a beef enterprise selling finished 
beasts. In total, eight case study investigations of farms in the SW region were 
conducted to capture the many different attributes of dairy and beef farming.  
Table 3: Attributes of case studies 
Dairy Enterprise  Beef Enterprise  Tenure 
Organic Organic  Wholly  rented 
Conventional Conventional  Mixed  tenure 
Pedigree Pedigree  Owner  Occupier 
Calf rearing  Lowland   
Dairy heifer rearing  SDA   
Closed herd  Stores   
Open herd  Finished   
On farm processing – non-pasteurised     
On farm processing - pasteurised     
In order to assess the wider economic impact of bTB a small number of key 
individuals from business connected to farming, such as vets, auctioneers, insurance 
brokers, were interviewed by telephone to comment on the impact of the disease on 
the wider rural economy. In total four interviews were conducted which, in the main, 
support evidence revealed by the case studies.  
3.1 Quantifying the cost of a farmer’s labour 
Estimating the cost of bTB in terms of a farmer’s labour is not straightforward since 
many farmers do not take a wage but instead draw income from the business to 
ensure the running of the farm household. This may be as little as £500 per month, 
which equates to approximately £2.50 hour assuming that only one person is 
working on the farm. Farm management handbooks such as Nix’s ‘Farm 
Management Handbook’ and the ‘Agricultural Budgeting and Costing Book’ supply 
minimum rates for agricultural workers at different grades. Accordingly, in 2009 Staff 
at Grade 6 with management responsibilities had an hourly rate of £8.45. However, 
using such a rate to estimate the labour costs of farmers may underestimate their 
true cost, as it does not reflect entrepreneurial risk. Furthermore, different types of 
farms will require different skills. Estimates for the cost of labour on cattle and sheep 
farms and dairy farms have been made respectively by Callwood (2006) and the 
RABDF (Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers) (2008). Using data on the type 
of work carried out and the education competencies of farmers, an average hourly 
rate of £11.18 was calculated for cattle and sheep farmers and £12.35 per hour for a 
dairy farmer.
2 Adjusting for wage inflation/deflation
3 to the end of January 2010, 
                                                 
2 The RABDF reports that the estimated hourly rate for a dairy farm is £16.70. This is calculated by assuming an average 
week of 37.5 hours and an additional 19.5 hours overtime. This gives an annual equivalent salary of £32.686. However, if 
the rate of £16.70 is multiplied by the number of hours per week this equates to an equivalent salary of £49.499. To ensure 
compatibility between the dairy and the beef and cattle farmers’ estimated wage rates, the methodology used the Callwood 
(2006) study is applied to the RABDF data. This results in a wage rate of £12.35 per hour.  
3 Data from the Average Earnings Index (AEI) excluding bonus is used.  
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these rates are respectively £12.17 and £12.67. Therefore, in this report, these 
figures are used when it is necessary to calculate management costs, thus providing 
a more appropriate estimate for the two farm types that have or are being affected by 
bTB. 
4. Results of case study farms 
In late March and early April, 2010, eight in-depth interviews were conducted with 
farmers that had recently endured or were still enduring a bTB breakdown and these 
form the basis of the case study analysis. Table 4 illustrates the business/enterprise 
attributes of these case studies. It can be seen that most were farms of mixed 
tenure, with only one that was solely owner-occupied and one that was totally rented.  
Half of the farms were dairy farms, with one of these rearing and milking pedigree 
stock, and another specialising in organic cows, the milk of which was turned into 
unpasteurised soft and hard cheese. Five farms reared beef animals, two of which 
reared pedigree stock. Four farmers described their beef herds as commercial beef, 
two sold store cattle (an upland farm and a dairy farm that reared its stores on 
common land). Three farms sold finished beef stock including one dairy farm that 
had recently begun their beef enterprise because of bTB breakdowns. A further farm, 
as a partial response to bTB, had sold its dairy herd to concentrate on rearing dairy 
heifers. Six of the case study farms operated a closed herd policy, although two 
farms had to buy in stock to replace animals slaughtered because of bTB. The only 
attribute from Table 3 not captured by the eight case study farms related to on-farm 
processing of pasteurised milk. Nevertheless, the case study examples illustrate a 
broad cross section of cattle farming in the region.  
Table 4: Attributes of case study farms 
TB  Farm  TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6 TB7 TB8 
Owner Occupier              
Mixed Tenure          
Wholly  Rented          
Upland            
Dairy          
Open herd          
Closed Herd        () ()  
Heifer Rearing           
Suckler Beef           
Stores            
Finished Cattle          
Commercial         
Organic           
Pedigree           
Processing facility             
() These farms operate a close herd programme but because of bTB, it has been necessary to buy in new 
stock. 
Taken as a whole, the case study farms show the range of costs associated with 
bTB breakdowns such as: the cost of testing; costs associated with movement 
restrictions; administrative costs, additional labour costs; costs of replacing stock and  
 
  7
sourcing cattle; costs associated with losses in production; costs from increasing 
biosecurity measures; as well as other costs. Clearly, each case study farm is 
different and as such, the costs reflect the personal circumstances, farm structure 
and a farmer’s ability to respond. The financial costs of bTB to each cease study 
farm is illustrated using a series of flow diagrams (see below).
4  
Farm TB1 (commercial beef) 
This beef and cereal farm produces finished beef from a suckler herd and from 
purchased calves. Of the 304 hectares farmed, 182 hectares is rented in. In terms of 
land use, 36% is used to grow arable crops with the remainder comprising of 
grassland for the cattle. The beef enterprise is the most important in terms of value 
of output, with the arable enterprise described as loss making. In terms of bTB, this 
farm has spent by far the most time under bTB restrictions. Indeed, from January 
2002 until February 2010, other than an 11-month bTB free period in 2004, the farm 
had been constantly subject to movement restrictions.  
The long-term nature of bTB restrictions meant that, compared to other farms in this 
case study analysis, it had adjusted its business model to farm in a manner that 
minimised the impacts of the disease. However, two particular costs, as illustrated in 
Figure 3, standout. The first regarded costs associated with testing, while the second 
related to livestock production losses. 
Most farms during a bTB breakdown are required to test cattle every 60 days. 
However, TB1 negotiated a 90-day testing regime because of the longevity of their 
breakdown and the large number of cattle (approximately 800) present on the farm. 
This provision saved the farm £4,742 in additional testing per year. Therefore, 
without a 90-day testing period the farm’s annual cost of testing would have been 
£14,227 rather than the £9,485 reported in Figure 3. The cost per animal, over a 
year was £11.89, which compared with other farms in the case study analysis was 
relatively low (see Section 5.1 for the comparison). This partly reflected the use 
family members and staff already employed on the farm. An additional cost identified 
by this farmer related to reduced live weight gain. TB1 argued that the testing of his 
animals reduced the weight gained by his animals, which he estimated cost his 
business £5,040 per annum.  
As a commercial cattle finisher, TB1 bought in cattle from two farms that were also 
under bTB restrictions. This reduced the need to replace stock slaughtered because 
of bTB. Indeed, it was part of the farmer’s normal business management practice 
during the period of the bTB breakdown.
5 As such, no cost was associated with 
movement restrictions and only minimal costs were associated with sourcing 
replacement stock. The stock that TB1 bought in went into designated isolation 
                                                 
4 Data in flowcharts may not add up exactly because of rounding. 
5 When the farm is not under bTB restrictions, the farmer sources stock in the same manner but from non bTB farms, from 
similar distances away.  
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buildings on the farm. Once tested, cattle with negative test results mixed with the 
other cattle. In selling livestock, TB1 favoured sales direct to a local abattoir 
(regardless of bTB status). Therefore, other than weight gain losses noted above, no 
additional losses were associated with sales.  
Figure 3: Case study Farm TB1 – a farm with a commercial (non-pedigree) beef herd 
 
Increased testing (every 
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Other than administrative costs at £265 for mandatory paperwork and £73 for 
voluntary activity, TB1 spent £685 on various biosecurity measures including raising 
water troughs (£195), double fencing part of the farm boundary (£390) and £100 on 
the isolation of cattle.  
Farm TB2 (heifer rearing/dairy) 
Comprising 51 hectares of grassland (with 12% rented in), this case study 
represents a relatively small farm. Furthermore, it shows how bTB can have a 
catalytic influence on the direction of the farm business. At the time of the last bTB 
breakdown (in December 2008), this case study was a 100 cow dairy farm and it is 
analysed in this respect. However, while bTB was a contributing factor to the ending 
of dairy farming, it only brought the decision forward rather than being the main 
driver behind the farm’s structural change.  
Presently, the farm comprises two enterprises: the rearing of dairy replacements 
(Holstein-Friesian) and a retained herd of 40 beef cross calves from the original dairy 
herd. The farm is a family partnership between the farmer and his wife with only one 
part-time employee. The only breakdown that this farm suffered lasted for 10 months 
between December 2008 and October 2009. During this period, the farm had 35 
reactors and 20 inconclusive reactors, with 25 confirmed with bTB lesions.  
By far the greatest cost for TB2 was the loss of milk production as yield dropped by 
280,000 litres (see Figure 4). At a price of 24.5ppl, this represented a loss of £68,600 
in income. It is interesting to note that the compensation received for the slaughtered 
animals (£72,600) covered little more than the loss of milk income. TB2 did not 
replace lost stock but instead exited milk production. However, changing from 
dairying to rearing dairy replacement heifers was not a direct consequence of bTB 
but the disease acted as a catalyst. The farmer was aware that his dairy enterprise 
did not have a longer-term future but the shock of his first and only bTB breakdown 
brought plans to cease milk production into fruition. While like-for-like replacement of 
cattle did not occur because of the change of enterprise, costs of finding new stock 
for the heifer rearing enterprise occurred in its place (£561).  
In terms of the farm’s beef enterprise, TB2 reared dairy cross beef calves. The 
imposition of movement restrictions restricted the sale of 30 calves aged between 3 
weeks and 3 months and these were kept for an additional 10 months. This cost the 
farm business an additional £7,699.  
Other costs included the administrative costs associated with bTB breakdown. For 
TB2 the mandatory element was the second highest compared to the other case 
study examples, but less time was spent involved in voluntary activity, which 
therefore kept the overall cost of administration down. Finally, costs of £550 were 
incurred by raising water trough heights and fencing around a wildlife area in 
response to the bTB outbreak.  
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Figure 4: Case study Farm TB2 – an ex-dairy farm now rearing dairy heifer 
replacements 
 
Farm TB3 (pedigree beef) 
The third case study farm is the most complicated in terms of land tenure and 
business structure, operating three different units, including a hill farm (32 hectares 
of SDA land). This farm extends to 324 hectares, most of which is owned, although 
one-quarter is rented. The farm also has access to a further 41 hectares of common 
grazing with whole year grazing rights but this is only utilised during the summer 
months. In terms of farm type, this is a beef, sheep and arable farm with beef being 
the most valuable output. The beef enterprise consists of 140 pedigree suckler cows 
and four beef bulls. As a family partnership, three family members work on the farm 
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as waged employees. Three part-time staff are employed on a self-employed basis. 
Detected through carcass tests at an abattoir in January 2010, this farm’s latest bTB 
breakdown was on-going at the time of the research having had 12 reactors and 4 
inconclusive reactors. While this was the farm’s latest breakdown on the home farm, 
it has had bTB on at least one of its three holdings for the past six years. 
Figure 5 illustrates the costs of the breakdown in the first five months. Unlike case 
studies TB1 and TB2, the loss of carcass and stock value were this farm’s greatest 
costs. Due to its latest breakdown, the farm missed its ‘six monthly window’ of being 
clear of bTB because of some unexpected reactors during the winter months. As a 
result, the business was unable to sell its beef bulls, resulting in overcrowding of 
intemperate animals and a loss in their value of approximately £200 (£9,600 in total) 
because of fighting and the carcasses being over age. However, the breeding bull 
enterprise has cost the farm £15,000. The sale of six breeding bulls reached only 
half the value expected for each bull (£3,000 instead of £6,000).  
Testing cost this farm £996 per test, and their current breakdown had already cost 
them £4,980. This however, was likely to increase since the breakdown had not run 
its course. As noted, the farm was unable to sell its beef bulls and as a result had 
incurred an additional cost of £3,539 in extra feeding, bedding and labour costs over 
a two-month period. With three separate holdings, the cost of applying for movement 
licences were as time consuming as other bTB associated paperwork. Mandatory 
administration costs therefore cost TB3 £158, although this is the third lowest in the 
case study farms. While this farm spent £252 in search of replacement stock, the 
sale did not continue since a pre-movement test on the vendor’s farm proved 
positive.  
Other costs proved much more difficult to determine. For example, the costs of under 
utilizing or over-grazing pasture on land not adjacent to the main farm. TB3 with its 
three separate holdings experienced stock management problems between farms. 
Finally, the cost of labour for cleaning an isolation shed was just over £48 for four 
hours of work using hired equipment at a rental rate of £60.   
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Farm TB4 (upland beef) 
This is an upland beef and sheep farm supplying pedigree stores to market. The 
family run farm employs no labour and consists of 233 hectares of owned land with 
30 hectares away from the homestead. While beef is the most important agricultural 
enterprise in terms of value of output, more significant to the business as a whole is 
income from non-farming activities (camping and holiday accommodation) on the 
farm. The beef enterprise consists of 76 pedigree suckler cows with the last bTB 
breakdown beginning in April 2009.  
The costs of increased testing and those associated with movement restrictions by 
far contributed the most to TB4’s total bTB breakdown costs (see Figure 6). With 
each bTB test costing £949, over the period of the breakdown this accrued to nearly 
£3,000. During the breakdown, the inability to sell store cattle led to the over-
wintering of additional youngstock. This accounted for an extra £3,033 in bedding, 
feed, and labour costs. 
Unlike the other case study farms, TB4 did not incur any costs associated with 
mandatory paperwork, arguing that these were no more than those normally related 
with the administration of the farm business. However, the principal farmer 
voluntarily travelled to meetings connected with bTB and took part in other research 
that resulted in a cost of £913, the second highest among the case studies.  
Farm TB4 invested in the following two biosecurity measures: raising the height of 
water troughs, which cost £150; and strip grazing with a back fence that required the 
purchase of additional electric fence equipment at £300. Finally, the cost of labour of 
cleaning an isolation shed was just over £24 for two hours of work using existing 
farm equipment and detergents.  
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Farm TB5 (pedigree dairy) 
With 330 pedigree dairy cows and 225 dairy followers, this case study represents the 
largest dairy farm, in terms of animal numbers. In terms of area, it has 223 hectares, 
of which 142 are rented. However, unlike the other dairy farms in this study, this farm 
grows a substantial quantity of fodder maize (113 hectares) with the remainder 
grassland. As well as dairy, this farm has approximately 60 beef cattle that are a by-
product of the dairy enterprise. In terms of number of cattle slaughtered as a result to 
bTB, this was the most affected farm. Detected through a pre-movement test, this 
farm’s last breakdown began in January 2009 and was on-going. It had suffered six 
breakdowns in the past 10 years.  
Three costs in Figure 7 are clearly apparent: lost income from reduced milk sales; 
additional feed and bedding costs because of movement restrictions; and the cost of 
new stock. Of these, the greatest cost was the loss of milk production income. With 
so many cows and heifers slaughtered and the inability to replace lost stock with 
cows of the same milk producing calibre, milk sales were reduced by 351,500 litres 
(a loss of £86,118). Included in this, was an estimated 2,000 litres loss in milk 
production associated with testing and test reading days (over eight days). This loss 
alone equated to £3,920.
6 The imposition of movement restrictions prevented the 
sale of dairy-bred beef cattle, which increased feed, bedding and labour costs by an 
additional £52,875. This high cost was related to keeping an additional 150 calves 
for a 15 month period. Presumably, at some point in the future some of these costs 
would be recouped when the cattle are sold. Thirdly, TB5 spent £40,000 in buying 
replacement dairy stock. Sourcing the correct stock was an issue for TB5, who 
reported that his pedigree dairy herd was in the top 1% of its breed. Therefore, while 
he spent many hours searching for stock of sufficient quality at a cost of £985, he 
argued that the stock he bought was not of the same milk producing quality. 
The cost of testing for bTB, while much less than some other costs, nevertheless 
cost this farm £9,122 since January 2009, with each test costing £1,140. This was 
the second highest in all of the eight case studies partly because of the time required 
to test all the cattle (approximately 670) on the farm. 
                                                 
6 The price the farmer was receiving for his milk was 24.5ppl.  
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Farm TB6 (commercial dairy) 
This case study demonstrates the affects of bTB on a small family dairy farm. 
Operating a closed herd policy with just 80 dairy cows, this example illustrates the 
vulnerability of dairy farms that have no other enterprise. The breakdown on this 
farm began in April 2009 and was clear after a further three tests. 
Similar to TB5, Figure 8 shows that the largest cost to TB6 was the loss of income 
from reduced milk production of 56,420 litres a cost to the farm of £14,542. Of this, 
TB6 estimated that production dropped by two litres per cow over the initial two 
milkings after testing (1,920 litres costing £471). The inability to afford the required 
number of replacement stock because of insufficient compensation meant that this 
farm had five fewer productive animals. As a result, the estimated financial loss from 
this was £14,072 since the cattle bought in have averaged 2,000 litres less per 
annum than those that they replaced. Furthermore, while marginal, their milk price 
was reduced by 0.1ppl because they were not able to meet a milk company target. 
Finally, in terms of milk production, this farm also lost £109 from its European Dairy 
Premium because of reduced milk production. In total, TB6 bought six replacement 
dairy cattle at a cost of £7,200 with a further £743 spent on their sourcing.  
With the lowest costs associated with testing and reading the test at £285, the cost 
of testing was £1,710 over the period of the breakdown. However, while the cost per 
test was the least in comparison with the other case study farms, in terms of cost per 
animal per test, at £1.95, this was not the case. The cost of administration costs for 
mandatory paperwork and meetings was £177. On the other hand, £988 was 
incurred in voluntary costs mainly due to expenses connected to meetings on bTB.  
Finally, TB6 is a small farm of approximately 40 hectares without the capacity to 
retain excess stock. This farm had looked into sending both its beef and dairy male 
calves to a licensed rearing unit. For the beef calves, TB6 felt that this undervalued 
their calves by between £30 and £50 per calf. However, unable to find a rearing unit 
that would take their Holstein Friesian bull calves, TB6 had no options but to shoot 
their newborn calves at a cost of £12 per calf.  
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Farm TB7 (commercial dairy and beef) 
This is the largest farm in the sample at 332 hectares. Farmed as a family 
partnership, it has 150 dairy cows, 182 dairy followers, and rears finished beef steers 
using male calves from the dairy enterprise. This latter enterprise is relatively new 
and was introduced to the farm’s activities partly in response to bTB breakdowns. Its 
most recent breakdown beginning in February 2008 and this farm was still under 
restrictions in April 2010.  
On this farm, similar to TB5 and TB6, reduced milk production accounted for the 
largest cost (see Figure 9). In this case, restocking occurred through the addition of 
surplus home reared heifers but this took time (for heifers to calf and start 
contributing) thus reducing milk production by 256,200 litres at a cost of £56,364. 
Unlike TB5 and TB6 however, TB7 suggested that milk production was not affected 
on test and reading days. 
The cost of movement restrictions in this case is less straightforward compared to 
the other case study farms. TB7 decided to start a cereal-beef enterprise for 
slaughter rather than shoot unsalable calves. Therefore, the estimated annual 
variable cost of this enterprise at £11,190 accounts for the additional feed,
7 bedding 
and labour requirements.  
With testing and reading costs at £634 per test, TB7 spent nearly £7,000 on tests 
over the period of their breakdown. Furthermore, TB7 noted that there were hidden 
costs on testing and reading days as lunch was given to all those involved, which 
was estimated to be £20 per test and £440 over the bTB breakdown.  
Other costs included £10,240 spent on biosecurity measures, with £9,500 paid for 
the double fencing of a single field, £500 on fencing walkways, and £240 on raising 
troughs. Further costs included the purchase of a handling system at a cost of 
£2,500, feeding additional staff on testing days, and for fuel needed to transport the 
cattle handling equipment around the farm. 
                                                 
7 As TB7 was feeding homegrown cereals, the cost of feed reflects their opportunity costs.  
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Farm TB8 (organic dairy/cheese producer) 
The final case study encompasses a number of different characteristics. As a 
relatively small County Council rented farm (44.5 hectares), it specialises in 
producing organic milk from 38 rare breed cross dairy cows. The milk was processed 
into different types of cheeses, including unpasteurised, for a local market. In 
addition to the dairy and cheese-making activities, the farm has access to common 
grazing upon which it grazes store cattle. The date of the most recent breakdown on 
this farm was October 2009.  
While the costs illustrated in Figure 10 are lower, compared to other case study 
farms particularly dairy farms, this case study demonstrates how additional costs due 
to bTB can become binding. On farm TB8, margins were extremely tight and 
therefore cash flow became problematic. The greatest cost, which affected cash 
flow, was the lost income from reduced milk production. The processing of most of 
the milk from this farm into cheese continued as normal. However, with five dairy 
cattle slaughtered the quantity of milk sold into the liquid market was reduced by 
35,200 litres at a cost of £7,963.  
The inability to sell store cattle because of movement restrictions required additional 
feed, fed in fields, and labour costs totalling nearly £3,000. The next highest cost 
was the cost of testing. At £874 per test, four tests cost the farm £2,623. To protect 
feed, TB8 bought a second-hand secure metal container as a wildlife proof store at a 
cost of £2,000.  
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Figure 10: Case study farm TB8 – farm with organic dairy herd, cheese making 
enterprise and store cattle grazed on common land 
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5. In-depth analyses of costs associated with bTB breakdowns on case study 
farms 
The summaries of each case study farm and their associated flowcharts have 
provided an overview of the costs associated with bTB breakdowns. This section 
explores in-depth the factors influencing these costs and explores why they can 
differ substantially between farms.  
5.1 Cost of bTB testing  
Before the detection of bTB, testing on each of the case study farms occurred on an 
annual basis, with the exception of biennial testing for TB8. Most of the recent 
breakdowns were detected through routine tests (see Table 5) although in case 
study TB3, the breakdown was detected through carcass tests at an abattoir and 
TB5 was detected through a pre-movement test. Once detected, the extent of bTB 
breakdowns between the case studies illustrates how some farms spend many years 
under bTB restrictions while for others the breakdown lasted less than a year. For 
three farms, the most recent bTB breakdown was ongoing.  






was first detected  
Length of last breakdown 
TB1 Annually  Routine  test  5  years* 
TB2  Annually  Routine test  Dec 2008 to Oct 2009 (10 months) 
TB3 Annually  Abattoir  test  6  years** 
TB4  Annually  Routine test  Apr 2009 – Sept 2009 (6 months) 
TB5  Annually  Pre-movement test  Jan 2009 - ongoing 
TB6  Annually  Routine test  Apr 2009 – Feb 2009 (10 months) 
TB7  Annually  Routine test  Feb 2008 - ongoing 
TB8  Biennial  Routine test  Oct 2009 - ongoing 
*TB1 has been under bTB restrictions since January 2002 other than for 11 months in 2004. 
**TB3 has had bTB on at least one of its three holdings for the past six years. 
The cost of bTB testing was very different on each of the case study farms (see 
Tables 6 and 7). The variance depends on factors such as time of the year, distance 
cattle are to livestock handing equipment, the type of farm, number of animals tested 
and the number of people used in testing. 
In considering the cost of bTB testing, the estimated dairy and beef farmers’ hourly 
rate is used to enable comparability between different farms types.
8 The hourly rate 
of labour is likely to be an overestimate since not all those involved are likely to be 
on the same hourly rate. For example, the use of a farmer’s teenage children or the 
use of unskilled labour is likely to be paid at a much lower rate. However, using a 
farmer’s hourly rate for all workers involved in the bTB tests enables some of the 
                                                 
8 For farms with both dairy and beef enterprises, the wage rate for the dominant enterprise is used.  
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opportunity costs to be captured, such as other work that must be carried out at a 
different time due the disruption associated with testing.  
Table 6 shows the cost of the test in two parts: the intradermal tuberculin (skin) test, 
and the reading of the results. Most of the farmers in the case study suggested that 
there was little difference in time between administering the skin test and reading the 
results. As one farmer put it: 
“By the time you’ve got the cattle in, injecting it, they just go bang bang. But reading it 
takes just as long. By the time that they’ve felt and made sure ….” (Interviewee TB4) 
As such, the cost differentiation between administering and reading the test were 
minimal, with only two farms suggesting that the reading test was marginally quicker 
and thus less expensive. In the example of TB1, the farmer supplied annual costs of 
bTB tests. Over the year (2008) with four 90-day tests per year, the total cost to the 
farm was £9,485.
9 In terms total costs, the cost per test on the eight case study 
farms ranged between £285 for TB6 and £2,371 for TB1. Clearly, part of this 
difference reflects the number of cattle being tested (146 compared to 798). The total 
cost over the period of the breakdowns is difficult to assess since three of the case 
study farms were still under restrictions, while two further farms had been under bTB 
restrictions for over five years. In case study TB5 for example, since January 2009 
bTB testing had cost £9,122 (or £7,982 if the cost of the annual bTB test is 
subtracted).  
Table 6: Cost of bTB testing on the eight case study farms 








Cost per test  Total cost 
over 
breakdown 
TB1* 798  £1,186  £1,186  £2,371  £9,485 
TB2 170 £222  £222  £445  £1,778 
TB3* 400  £498 £498 £996 £4,980 
TB4 81  £247  £247  £494  £2,964 
TB5 668 £634  £507  £1,140  £9,122 
TB6 146 £171  £114  £285  £1,710 
TB7 465 £380  £253  £634  £6,969 
TB8 146 £570  £304  £874  £2,623 
*These values have been calculated on a yearly basis. 
The approximate cost per animal over each test and the breakdown period varied 
considerably. For example, the lowest cost per animal per test was £1.36 on farm 
TB7 while this increased to £6.10 on farm TB4, although most were between £1.95 
and £2.97 per animal per test. In terms of enterprises, there were no discernible 
differences between beef and dairy farms. In an earlier study of the costs of bTB 
Sheppard and Turner (2005) reported that the cost per animal per test ranged from 
                                                 
9 Testing was supposed to occur every 60 days. However, the cost of this to TB1 would be £14,227 per year so a 90-day 
testing period was requested. If the farm exceeds this 90 days Defra will not sanction cattle to be bought and brought on to 
the farm.   
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42 pence to £4.13 for dairy herds and 69 pence to £3.92 for beef herds. Clearly, 
while the cost of testing has increased, the majority are still within this range. 
TB4 however, does stand out. This farm, an upland farm, selling beef stores, had 
land in two different places. As such, it was necessary for farmer to move his 
handling equipment between farms:  
“Its picking up the whole handling system, taking all the handling system down, taking 
it to the other place, putting the whole handling system up, getting the cattle in … its 
very time consuming.” (Interviewee TB4) 
Furthermore, as cattle were tested in two locations, this necessitated the movement 
of handing equipment, the vet to visit on two separate days, and the employment of 
additional casual labour. Effectively, this doubled the cost of each test. On other 
farms with land away from the main holding, handling equipment was in place or 
portable equipment was used that reduced the time of testing.  
Table 7: Cost of bTB testing on the eight case study farms per animal 
Farm Cattle  tested  Cost  per 




TB1* 798  £2.97 £11.89 
TB2 170 £2.62  £10.46 
TB3* 400  £2.49 £12.45 
TB4 81  £6.10  £36.59 
TB5 668 £1.71  £13.66 
TB6 146 £1.95  £11.72 
TB7 465 £1.36  £14.99 
TB8 146 £5.99  £17.96 
*These values have been calculated on a yearly basis. 
The employment of causal labour to assist on testing days varied. Three farms, TB1, 
TB2 and TB8 used no additional labour since these farms had a large enough 
workforce to cope with the additional demands of labour that bTB testing brought. 
Other farms relied on family help. For example, TB7 used their children as help. The 
remaining farms hired in additional labour, usually on a self-employed basis. The 
ability to employ family will depend on whether family members are available. If they 
are, as this interviewee suggests: 
“It is cheaper to employ family than not, than people from away.” (Interviewee TB4) 
However, it was not always possible to find casual staff, and for TB5 this proved 
difficult.  
While Tables 4 and 5 provide indicative costs of bTB testing on farms across the SW 
of England, it does not account for hidden costs, such as losses to production, 
particularly on dairy farms, and the disruption of other activities. As these farmers put 
it:   
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“You are taking away from your core duties so you are not spotting cows bulling, you 
are not trimming feet, you are causing stress on cows, you are running them through 
the crush, they become needle shy, there are increased risks of injury, abortions, 
mastitis, lameness.” (Interviewee TB5) 
“Everything else grinds to a halt ... which puts pressure on other things. If you had five 
of us or six of us spending one day that’s more than a week gone so ... We are testing 
next week [in early April] and if we had five of us out on a tractor we would cover 
some ground in one day.” (Interviewee TB3) 
Another farm (TB7) noted the disruption of haymaking and silage making by having 
to carry out skin tests. However, another farmer who only had dairy cows with very 
little arable activity, took a more pragmatic view:  
“It doesn’t [disrupt other enterprises] but you just have to make sure that you arrange 
everything around it …it’s not like they just turn up, you do have notice” (Interviewee 
TB6) 
The loss of milk production on some dairy farms may be a further hidden cost. For 
example, farm TB6 estimates that production drops by two litres per cow over the 
initial two milkings after testing. Furthermore, behavioural difficulties in the cows led 
to the animals not wanting to enter the parlour, being frisky once in the parlour and, 
being more messy than normal. Consequently, milking took much longer. A much 
larger dairy farm (TB5) suggested that his losses were 2,000 litres over the testing 
and reading days, which was worth around £490. Taking the cost of this production 
loss over the last bTB breakdown (which included eight tests), this equated to 
approximately £3,920.
10  
Not all dairy farms reported a loss in milk production. Farm TB7 suggested that milk 
production was not affected.  
“The dairy herd is done very, very quickly coz what they [the dairy cows] do is to go 
into self locking yokes where they’re feeding. So their food is in front of them all the 
time so we don’t see any drop in milk. So we do however many there is. At one point, 
we were up to 180 [dairy cows]. They are literally done within less than an hour. And 
they’ve got food in front of them so we don’t see any drop in milk.” (Interviewee TB7) 
However, TB7 commented on some of the hidden costs on TB testing and reading 
days:  
“It’s only a minor thing but my mother-in-law used to feed us. She’d come around and 
give us dinner and everything. Well you think about it, she’s feeding those people … I 
put down £20 every time because even if she does sandwiches … £20 quid don’t go far 
when you’re buying ham and all that lot … that’s £440 there.  
                                                 
10 The price the farmer was receiving for his milk was 24.5ppl.  
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And then another we thought of is travelling around with the crush gates and handling 
systems, the fuel costs on that … coz we used to take two tractors and that was £825 
quid in fuel alone. You see, we have ground the other side of Bridgewater and on that 
day we had to go … so we’d have six moves in a day. 
The direct costs of bTB testing are relatively easy to calculate, but as this section 
has illustrated, they are highly variable across farms due to a wide range of factors 
including the number of animals tested, the labour used (and it’s cost), distance to 
handling equipment and so on. However, the are also a range of indirect and often 
hidden costs associated with testing such as the knock-on impacts on other activities 
(e.g. delays to silage making), impacts on milk production (although not all farmers 
experience this), behavioural difficulties in cattle and additional fuel and (human) 
feed costs.  
5.2 Cost of movement restrictions  
Of the eight case study farms, six had experienced difficulties and extra expense 
because of cattle movement restrictions. Table 8 illustrates the types of cattle 
enterprises affected by movement restrictions. In most cases, farmers found it 
difficult to estimate the cost of keeping animals for extended periods. Therefore, 
Table 9 estimates these costs using information that the farmers provided and costs 
from ABC (2009). Some farms, TB1 and TB3, have adapted marketing channels to 
sell stock direct to slaughter. However, TB3 expected to sell its 18-20 bulls in the 
spring but because of an unexpected positive bTB test in the winter, this was not 
possible. The cost of keeping stock accrued in extra costs such as additional 
bedding, feed and labour required to keep stock on the farm. On TB8, these 
additional costs became binding since on this small rented farm, margins were 
extremely tight and therefore cash flow became problematic. The estimates provided 
in Table 9 indicate the likely costs of having to keep additional cattle for the case 
study farms, taking into account not only additional feed, bedding and labour costs 
but also the relative length of time that these farms have had to retain their stock. 
Table 8: Cattle affected by movement restrictions 
   Type of cattle  Number  Age 
TB1
†      
TB2  Beef calves  30  3 weeks to 3 months 
TB3*  Beef bulls  48  18 months 
TB4  Store calves  50  7 months 
TB5  Beef calves  150   
TB6**      
TB7  Beef calves  25  6 months 
TB8  Beef stores  30  18 months 
†TB1 - Most stock goes direct to abattoir, although would have sold better quality stock through livestock market 
*TB3 – Most stock goes direct to abattoir 
**TB6 - Do not keep excess stock  
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Table 9: Estimated costs as a consequence of movement restrictions 











TB2  £282 £7,050  2.1  £649 £7,699 
TB3  £432 £3,456  0.9  £83  £3,539 
TB4  £182 £3,033  0.8  £164 £3,198 
TB5  £282 £52,875  1.1  £2,602  £55,477 
TB7*  £432 £10,800  1.3  £390 £11,190 
TB8  £197 £2,955  1.8  £320 £3,275 
*TB7 – Rather than being an additional cost, TB7 took the decision to begin a cereal beef enterprise. Therefore, this represents 
the costs of the new enterprise over a one year period. 
The inability to move stock off-farm (or around a farm with more than one holding) 
was illustrated by TB4. The restricted movement of cattle from this upland farm, 
which sold stores once a year, led to particular financial difficulties. As TB4 suggests: 
“The critical one is in the autumn when you want to sell the cows, the suckler calves off 
the cows … I’d sell the whole 50 [suckler calves] … The consequences are you’ve got 
to keep them for 120 days minimum, you’ve got no feed, no shed space because you 
keep dry cows through the winter time. You then run into a welfare problem and a cost 
problem because you’ve relied on … that is your only income from those cattle at that 
time. You’ve got all the other added costs gone out like buying your … doing your hay, 
your silage, buying your straw for your cows and that’s all got to be paid for. If you 
have no income from those calves and you’ve actually got to buy more straw, you’ve 
got to get more silage, and you haven’t got shed space, you are kind of stuffed, up the 
creek with out a paddle. (Interviewee TB4) 
As TB8 illustrates, this experience was not necessarily confined to only upland 
farms. TB8, rearing organic stores on common land in a lowland area, had to keep 
store cattle, which were normally sold in the autumn, for an additional six months. 
This led to increased cost in feeding, a ‘hugely increased work load’ and, because of 
a lack of proper accommodation, problems of over-stocking occurred that breached 
organic certification regulations. The financial stress that this causes echoes that of 
TB4 above in that:  
“About 30 calves that we’d dearly love to sell, so would the bank manager.” 
(Interviewee TB8) 
Apart from additional feed and bedding that is needed for excess stock, overstocking 
of livestock on one holding or another manifests itself in other ways. For instance, 
TB3 commented on his missed ‘six monthly window’ of being clear of bTB because 
of some unexpected reactors during the winter months. Without this window, the 
farm had not been able to sell its bulls, resulting in overcrowding of intemperate 
animals and a loss in their value of approximately £9,600:  
So we’ve got an overload of bulls that are getting a bit frisky. Their carcass value has 
collapsed because they’re fighting and they’re over age for carcasses. [Interviewer]  
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How much do you think it has collapsed by? [Farmer] One would have hoped that they 
would have made ... they will have dropped £200 on their carcass values easily. And 
what is there ... er ... 48 bulls.” (Interviewee TB3) 
A further consequence and cost of overstocking, particularly for dairy farms without 
the required facilities, is the question of what to do with Holstein Friesian bull calves. 
TB7, for example, set up its own barley beef unit to rear these calves but not all 
farms were in this position. TB6 was less fortunate in this respect. With a small area 
(approximately 40 hectares), this farm had looked to sending both its beef and dairy 
male calves to a licensed rearing unit. However, for the beef calves TB6 felt that this 
undervalued their calves by between £30 and £50 per calf. Moreover, TB6 was 
unable to find a rearing unit that would take their Holstein Friesian bull calves and 
therefore, during their breakdown they had no other option but to shoot the newborn 
calves at a financial and personal cost:  
“At the moment I can get between £50 and £70 per calf. That’s picked up, collected. So 
if I took the calf to market I might get a bit more. And it costs me £12 an animal to 
shoot them. So it’s between £70 to £90 it’s costing per animal. And I think we’ve 
probably lost 20 animals. [Husband] We were lucky really because we had a run of 
heifer births. [Wife] Okay, you haven’t got the cost of rearing them for 40 days but 
[Husband] It’s morally wrong. [Wife] It’s very morally wrong. I hate doing it. 
[Husband] Yes. [Wife] We are not in farming to shoot animals. [Husband] It doesn’t 
fill you with glee. [Wife] I feel good that I can keep them and I’ve got some going 
tomorrow and that’s great. And to tell you the truth, I don’t ... as long as they make 
okay money I don’t really care what we get for them because I hate, I hate the idea of 
all the waste associated with ... It’s just a waste. The waste is horrendous.” 
(Interviewees TB6) 
Other costs are much more difficult to determine. In particular, the costs of either 
under utilizing or over grazing pastures for farms with more than one holding or land 
that is not adjacent to the main farm. TB3, for instance, had three separate holdings 
resulting in stock management problems between farms:  
“All of those … just restrictions make managing a herd a lot more difficult. We can’t 
move from here up on to the hill farm when we want, when grazing is suited … you just 
can’t say there’s more grass up here when one place is getting short of grass … it’s 
difficult to manoeuvre.[Farmer’s wife interjects] It was easier when both places were 
down, a lot easier. (Interviewee TB3)  
A further concern regarding stock management and grazing was expressed by TB6 
and his ability to meet cross-compliance regulations on his ESA land. Since 
movement restrictions meant that stock were left on the moor for longer than the 
farmer would have preferred, signs of poaching occurred which was of concern to 
the National Park Authority: 
“They don’t believe. They say ‘you are poaching all that ground.’ And I say, well I 
don’t really want to poach it; I don’t want to muck up that ground. And they come  
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along and go, ‘well we going to penalise you because you’ve mucked the ground’. And 
I say, well hang on two different whammies now. You’ve hit me two ways, you’ve ... (a) 
I didn’t want to muck it up, and (b) now your imposing a fine, when it’s going to affect 
me twice now.” (Interviewee TB4) 
The costs of bTB movement restrictions ripple out across the business affecting 
labour, feed and bedding costs, creating animal welfare issues and causing 
unintended contraventions of other regulations such as organic certification 
requirements and cross-compliance. This section has also begun to indicate the 
personal costs of bTB on farmers and their families (see section 7). As with the costs 
of testing, the costs of movement restrictions reflect the individual characteristics of 
particular farm business, the spatial configuration of the land holdings, the specific 
features of the farm enterprises, etc, suggesting that average figures can mask much 
of the complexity of cost assessment.  
5.3 Replacement costs  
Replacing stock lost during a bTB breakdown will depend on a range of factors such 
as the number lost, whether a farm had an open or closed breeding programme, the 
availability stock of appropriate quality and at an affordable price. Table 10 shows 
that five of the eight farms purchased new stock in response to a bTB breakdown. A 
sixth farm (TB3) attempted to buy replacement stock but this sale did not continue 
since a pre-movement test on the vendor’s farm proved positive!  
Table 10: Restocking farm after bTB breakdown 
Farm Restocked  with  purchased 
cattle 
Had restrictions imposed 
on restocking 
Difficulties in finding right 
type/quality of stock 
TB1** Yes  Yes  No 
TB2* No  N/A  N/A 
TB3
† No  N/A  Yes 
TB4
†† No  N/A  N/A 
TB5 Yes  Yes  Yes 
TB6 Yes  Yes  Yes 
TB7 No  N/A  N/A 
TB8 No  (Yes)  Yes 
TB1** Restocked with cattle form a different type of enterprise.  
TB2* Changed enterprise from dairy to heifer rearing as a result of bTB. 
TB3
† Cattle sought but not purchased because of two positive results with the pre-movement bTB test. 
TB4
†† Breed own replacements. 
TB1, a commercial cattle finisher, employed a strategy to buy cattle in from farms 
that were also under bTB restrictions. Using this approach, TB1 used two farms to 
supply replacements. The stock had to go into designated buildings on the farm but 
once tested, if the tests proved negative, they could be mixed with the other cattle. 
TB1 clearly identified the benefits of such an arrangement:  
“Well, it’s a slight bonus for ourselves, because we were buying from people that were 
under restriction they were slightly cheaper … they could only sell them to somebody 
who was also … nobody that wasn’t under restriction were going to buy their stock  
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were they coz as soon as they’d bought theirs, the whole heard would be under 
restriction themselves. They couldn’t sell them to somebody who was unrestricted. They 
could get five quid for them from the hunt; this is calves now at birth, or five quid or 10 
quid from the abattoir if they kept them for 10 days. So if I was prepared to give 20 or 
25 quid for a Friesian bull calf they were actually gaining and I was gaining a bit as 
well. I don’t mean that the calf would have been £50 in the market but I was gaining 
five quid or 10 quid per calf depending how good the calf was. So you know we just 
had a little bit of compensation there. (Interviewee TB1) 
However, not all farms are so fortunate. For example, TB6, the small dairy farm that 
was under severe status, could only buy cattle from clean herds. This, they argued, 
restricted the options open to the farm in buying in new stock since they were not 
able to buy from a standard (bTB restricted) herd dispersal where they could expect 
to pay £200 less per animal for genetically similar animals with similar yields to their 
own dairy cows.  
One of the main concerns regarding restocking, which has long-term costs to farms, 
is the ability to replace cattle with the same quality as the slaughtered stock. As 
noted in Section 6, compensation does not discriminate between average, below or 
above average quality. TB3, rearing pedigree beef, typified the problems that can 
arise when bTB disrupts a farm’s usual restocking policy: 
“What we are sadly doing is ... we’d normally buy in 25 calves and select them back to 
the number we want, keeping the best ones, but we’re finding now that we have to keep 
everything. And our pedigree heifers, we’re keeping virtually everything because the 
TB is doing the culling for us and not necessarily the ones we want to cull. So our herd 
is going backward rather than going forward. And when you’ve got a son in his early 
20s, that’s not the way you really want to be going.” (Interviewee TB3) 
Sourcing the correct stock was also an issue for TB5, a pedigree dairy farmer who 
spent many hours searching for stock of sufficient quality: 
“I spent probably a fair ounce before I found these. I went to farm sales, fair bit of 
research, and came up with somebody luckily through word of mouth. It was difficult. 
Five or six days work.” (Interviewee TB5). 
For another dairy farm (TB6) while, as noted above, stock had to be sourced from 
‘clean’ farms, introducing the stock into their herd changed the seasonality of 
production:  
“We had several which were dry and we’ve had massive gapping gaps where we 
should ... we lost dry ones ... we lost three or four that were ready to calve and we have 
gaps and that’s our production profile ... I don’t know how much you can see it on our 
production profile but you can definitely see it in the ... [Husband] I think it was a bit 
of a mix with some dry ones, some freshly calved ones and some middle lactation ones 
... [Wife] Yeah. I would have said, when I looked in the book and thought um we’ve got  
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a bit of a space here those were the animals that we lost that should have calved in the 
space.” (Interviewee TB6). 
Table 11 shows the costs of sourcing replacement stock. This includes labour time 
taken to source cattle, the cost of travelling to see stock, and the costs of haulage 
once the cattle were bought. For TB1, replacement stock was sourced from two local 
farms that were under the same level of bTB restrictions. As such, the total cost of 
£43 reflects the annual cost of sourcing his stock from these farms. TB5 and TB6 
recorded the highest costs associated with sourcing replacement stock. As noted 
above, the time spent on scouring websites and auction catalogues to find the 
correct quality stock can take many working days.  
Table 11: Costs associated with sourcing replacement stock 









TB1  3  20    £37  £6  £43 
TB2*  5   £500   £61   £561 
TB3  16  180    £195  £57  £252 
TB5  50  400  £250   £609 £127 £985 
TB6  48  60  £80 £60 £584  £19 £743 
Restocking the farm may in part depend on the compensation received. TB6 could 
only afford to replace six of the 11 of the slaughtered dairy cattle. As a result, it 
incurred a financial loss of £14,072 since the cattle bought in averaged 2,000 litres 
less milk per annum than those that they replaced. The replacement stock, it was 
argued, did not cope well with the farm’s existing dairy system. Furthermore, 
because TB6 was paid on a volume collection basis, the dip in milk production meant 
that they dropped into a lower band, reducing their milk price from 24.5ppl to 24.4ppl. 
While this is only a very marginal change, on 720,000 litres of annual production this 
amounts to a £720 reduction in income. Finally, a loss of £109 was also attributed to 
less income being received from the European Dairy Premium, which was calculated 
on the basis of litres sent to the processor.  
Not all farms, as Table 11 shows, decided to buy in replacement stock. Some 
preferred to try to keep their herds closed and restock from within. TB7, a 
commercial dairy herd, took this approach: 
“[Interviewer] How are you restocking? [Farmer] Through our own replacements and 
keeping the beef calves so our numbers are going up again. Our numbers are low on 
the dairy herd but we’ll build that up by home breeding because we’re a closed herd 
and we’d like to keep it that way.” (Interviewee TB7). 
However, for dairy herds this approach has a cost in lost milk production. For 
example, TB7 stated that 61 heifers were slaughtered because of bTB. If, on 
average, these herd replacements had produced 4,200 litres of milk in their first year 
of calving at a price of 22p per litre this would equate to approximately £924 for each 
heifer. Therefore, with 61 heifers no longer available to the herd, this equates to a  
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total loss of £56,364 in milk sales. Furthermore, since a business decision by this 
farm had been to replace stock through rearing their own replacements, this is a real 
loss in milk sales.  
The ability of dairy farms to replace lost cows may be important in determining the 
scale of lost milk production. If a farm, such as TB8, has an adequate supply of 
heifers and only loses a few milking cows at any one time the impact may be less 
conspicuous: 
“We just restock with home bred. We don’t go out and buy. If they’re only taking like a 
few at a time it makes little impact on us as we have that many heifers to replace with.” 
(Interviewee TB8) 
However, as in the case of TB7, where it was the heifers that succumbed to bTB and 
there were no replacements, this led to a farm policy of keeping cattle longer, with 
associated problems of lameness, mastitis and other conditions: 
“Before TB we were becoming a young herd which was good because then you don’t 
have your husbandry things, like your feet and things like that, whereas we’ve had to 
put that plan on to the back burners at the moment until we’ve built the numbers up. 
With a younger herd you do substantially reduce your vet bills.” (Interviewee TB7) 
The costs associated with replacing stock vary considerably, and the practicalities of 
replacing stock can have wider impacts on herd management and the farm business. 
Due to the variability of compensation payments and the mismatch between 
compensation payments and market values, not all farms can afford to replace all 
cattle slaughtered. In turn, this can be associated with a significant loss of revenue 
from reduced milk sales. Some farms have chosen to maintain a closed herd and 
breed their own replacements. Again, this can be associated with a significant loss of 
milk revenue. 
5.4 Administration costs of bTB on farms 
The administration costs arising from a bTB breakdown are divided into: (i) those 
that are necessary because of a bTB breakdown, and (ii) additional voluntary 
activities, such as co-operating with research activity, attending industry body 
meetings, or lobbying activities. For each case study farm, the cost for each activity 
was calculated using the farmer hourly rates of £12.17 for cattle and sheep farmers 
and £12.67 for dairy farmers.  
Most of the case study farms identified additional administrative costs associated 
with bTB, although farmers often found it difficult to quantify how many hours were 
involved. Indeed, this dialogue between a husband and wife farming in partnership 
typifies the difficulties in estimation.   
“[Farmer’s wife] I spend more time on the phone to the ministry trying to sort out 
dates and booking dates ... it’s several hours ...[farmer] for every test there is an hour  
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spent on the phone one way or another sorting it out ... [farmer’s wife] Ministry vet 
comes out once or twice ...[Famer] Yep. [Farmer’s wife] you can’t send over 30 
month, yeah over 30 month with under 30 month they’ve got to go on two different days 
so you have to pick out two separate lots of cattle. You’ve got to keep all them ... its two 
different lots of loading cos they all can’t go on one load. [Farmer] They come in here 
... although they’re doing the paperwork here and sorting ... [Farmer’s wife] We’ve got 
to be here. [Farmer] So every test there is probably three hours extra on the 
paperwork side.” (Interviewee TB3) 
Table 12 quantifies the hours and costs of administrative work associated with bTB. 
Only TB4 suggested that bTB had created no additional costs above those normally 
related with the administration of the farm business. Costs amongst other farms 
varied between an additional 10 hours and 37 hours over the course of a breakdown. 
For three of the farms, paperwork and meetings contributed over 75% to the 
additional administrative work. The cost of bTB administration ranged from nothing 
for farm TB4 to £469 for farm TB5. While there is compulsory paperwork that is 
necessary to complete, some of the other additional costs reflected the type and 
structure of the farm.  
Six of the eight farms applied for movement licences. For farm TB3, with three 
separate holdings, the cost of applying for movement licences were as time 
consuming as other bTB associated paperwork. Telephone calls tended to be 
associated with time organising vet appointments and transport for animals, which 
might take two to three hours per breakdown. One farmer, TB7, suggested that 
telephone calls tended not to require additional time because as she put it: “to be 
honest, telephone calls are made on my mobile when I’m walking around doing other 
things”.  
Table 12: Costs of administrating bTB  
Time  TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6 TB7 TB8 
Licence  applications  2 10  4   5 4   8 
Paperwork/meetings  16  10  6   30  8 19   
Telephone  calls  3 2 3   2 2   2 
Total  21 22 13 0  37 14 19 10 
Cost          
Licence  applications  £24 £122  £49 £0  £63 £51 £0  £101 
Paperwork/meetings  £195 £122 £73  £0  £380 £101 £241 £0 
Telephone  calls  £37 £24 £37 £0  £25 £25 £0  £25 
Total  £256 £268 £158 £0  £469 £177 £241 £127 
In addition to the necessary administrative costs of bTB, some of the farmers 
engaged in additional voluntary activities, which while not necessary in terms of 
management nevertheless, provided farmers with an avenue to express how bTB 
had affected their farms. For example, two farmers had travelled to London to lobby 
parliament about bTB. Another had given three television and one radio interview to  
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publicise the difficulties farmers face in living with bTB. Others belonged to industry 
or support groups.  
Table 13 shows the costs of voluntary activity relating to bTB. Clearly, there is a 
quite large variation between farms since some farmers had spent many more hours 
involved in voluntary action. However, every case study farm incurred some costs in 
excess of the time generated by this research, and this ranged from £73 for farm 
TB1 and £988 for farm TB6. 
Table 13: Voluntary cost associated with bTB 
Time  TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6 TB7 TB8 
Paperwork    5   2   5 2 2 
Telephone  calls  3 2   1   1    
Meetings  3  26 10 72 12 72 4  14 
Total  6  33 10 75 12 78 6  16 
Costs          
Paperwork  £0 £61  £0 £24  £0 £63  £25  £25 
Telephone  calls  £37 £24 £0  £12 £0  £13 £0  £0 
Meetings  £37  £317 £122 £877 £152 £912 £51  £177 
Total  £73  £402 £122 £913 £152 £988 £76  £203 
5.5 Cost of biosecurity measures  
Most of the farms studied had implemented some form of biosecurity measure to 
reduce the incidence of bTB. Table 14 illustrates the type and costs of such 
measures. However, not all measures taken by farmers are included in the table 
because these either were implemented as part of wider farm improvements rather 
than specifically to reduce the potential incidence of bTB, or were not costed. For 
example, some farmers regarded the double fencing of farm boundaries as good 
practice since it can play a role in reducing the incidence of bTB, although other 
farmers were more sceptical. Only two farms implemented this on part of their farms 
as a direct measure to reduce the incidence of bTB. Furthermore, the majority of 
case study farms had herd health plans in place and routinely conducted pre-
movement tests. 
The most common measure implemented to raise the height of feed and water 
troughs, although not all farmers agreed that this would reduce infringements by 
wildlife. This was a relatively low cost measure. The most expensive measure 
implemented at £9,500 was the double fencing of a boundary field by TB7 while TB8 
purchased a second hand feed secure metal container at £2,000 to ensure that 
wildlife had no direct access to bags of animal feed. Other costed measures included 
improving the facilities for the isolation of incoming cattle, and the use of strip fencing 
with a backing fence.  
 
  36
In the future, the most likely biosecurity measure would be the proofing of farm 
buildings against wildlife. Others included better sourcing of cattle, the raising of 
water troughs, making fields more wildlife proof and the isolation of reactors and 
inconclusive reactors.  
Table 14: The type and costs of biosecurity measures that have been taken on farms 
to reduce the incidence of bTB 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TB1     £195     £390   £100       £684 
TB2  £500    £50             £550 
T B 3                 £ 0  
TB4     £150  £300            £450 
T B 5                   £ 0  
T B 6                   £ 0  
TB7  £500    £240     £9,500         £10,240 
TB8               £2,000  £2,000 
5.6 Long term costs of bTB on business decisions 
The impact that bTB has on business decision-making depends on the structure of 
the business, such as the number of enterprises on the farm, the relative proportion 
of cattle enterprises to the farm business as a whole or the level of indebtedness. 
Table 15 illustrates whether or not bTB has had any impact on various business 
decisions including increasing the business’ overdraft limit or taking out a loan to 
ease cash flow issues; the postponement or cancellation of investment or planned 
farm expansion; and the decision to diversify or not into other or new lines of 
business. All farms, with the exception of TB4, had found it necessary to alter their 
business decisions because of a bTB breakdown. TB4 on the other hand, had a 
special arrangement between the farm business and their holiday accommodation 
business that enabled one business to borrow against the other if cash flow became 
difficult. Without this facility, the farmer conceded that he would have increased his 
overdraft.  
As a result of bTB, for half of the eight farms it had been necessary to increase the 
size of their overdrafts. However, such a strategy can be associated with additional 
difficulties in managing the farm business. In particular, if cash flow is dependent on 
autumn cattle sales, this can debilitate the farm’s daily existence, as this farmer 
explains:   
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“I can’t tell you how much its affected us … we normally have a crop of animals to sell 
towards the end of the autumn … we’ve actually kept them so we don’t have any … 
we’ve had to feed them. [Interviewer: And have you had to extend your overdraft?] 
“Hugely, hugely. And it’s constantly getting towards its upper limit and worrying. You 
thank God when someone sends you a cheque and you can get it in the bank. You know, 
it’s just hand to mouth, it’s absolutely hand to mouth.” (Interviewee TB8) 
However, the impact can reach far beyond a farmer’s dependency on a particular 
sale. This small dairy farm illustrates the effects of bTB on the family as a whole 
because of breakdown: 
“[Wife] We’re poor basically. [Husband] Yeah, we haven’t got any fun money. [Wife] 
Well there’s no money, full stop. We’ve had to up the overdraft significantly. There is 
no fun money last of all, but first of all there is none, there is very reduced income so 
our overdraft has increased … so I’ve had to borrow more from the bank because you 
haven’t got the milk sales. You are still paying off your loans but you are doing that 
with your overdraft. [Husband] And we are looking to diversify more. [Wife] Yeah, and 
you are looking away from farming for other sources of income because you just think 
well they’re not doing anything about it and we could be hit again … and if we are hit 
again, it will be even worse than it is now. And I’m dreading the bank manager visiting 
in June, because you don’t know what he’s going to say, do you. I mean, we are 
probably not … we didn’t lose as many as others, we haven’t been in the breakdown 
period as long as others but because you’ve got such a small herd you haven’t got the 
cushioning.” (Interviewee TB6) 
Other farms, such as TB4 and TB7 point to an advantage in having a diversified 
business that enables cross subsidisation between businesses to ease any cash 
flow problems: 
“But we are lucky, we’ve got the diversification, the bed and breakfast so we can 
absorb it a little bit where as some farmers haven’t got the opportunity for that” 
(Interviewee TB7) 
Table 15: Impacts of bTB on business decisions 
  TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6 TB7 TB8 
Take out loan or increase 
overdraft to overcome losses/cash 
flow difficulties 
Yes  No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cancel/postpone investment in 
stock, premises or equipment 
No No Yes No  Yes  Yes  Yes No 
Cancel/postpone business 
expansion plans 
Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes  No 
Diversify into other or new lines of 
business 
Yes  Yes  No No No Yes  No No 
Three farms had either cancelled or postponed both farm investment and expansion 
plans. For example, TB5 (a large dairy farm) had an on-going expansion programme 
that: “is being held up by losing stock”. Another farm (TB1) had planned to expand 
the cattle side of his business and reduce his arable but as he put it: “because we 
had TB, it puts you off.”  
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Other farms still see the need for investment, despite having no capital to invest 
because of reduced income resulting from their bTB breakdowns:  
“[Husband] But we’re going to have to build the slurry store and that’s another … 
[Wife] Well yes but that’s all regulatory stuff and … [Husband] Yeah but we’ll have to 
do it and it’ll take a lot longer … [Wife] Yeah it is. [Husband] … to be paid for” 
(Interviewee TB6) 
“We have got planned expansion for the dairy equipment side which will increase our 
production. I wouldn’t say it’s been put on hold, and I’d even say we’ve got to do it 
more because we need to increase the income, but we haven’t got the money to do it so 
we are having to think how we can do it.” (Interviewee TB8) 
Yet another farm, TB1 argued that despite having bTB for the best part of eight 
years, this had not stopped investment in the farm: 
“I don’t suppose TB has stopped any investment that we would have done. We’ve never 
not bought land. Well it has affected the profit but yes but we’ve never not put a 
building up because we had TB. Not really.” ( Interviewee TB1) 
These different reactions regarding investment and expansion illustrate that bTB 
may only be one of a range of influences on strategic decision-making that affect the 
direction in which the farm develops. In some cases, the change may be much more 
dramatic. As the following illustration shows, while TB2 was aware that his dairy 
enterprise did not have a longer-term future, the shock of his first and only bTB 
breakdown brought plans to cease milk production very much to the fore: 
“It was instrumental in the decision to cease milk production. We had been considering 
doing so … basically we’ve got three daughters, two are now living at … and the third 
is at university so it was obvious that none of them were going to take the farm on, 
particularly take the dairy herd on anyway, so to a certain extent the writing was on 
the wall. You knew the day would come when some time or other. When we had TB as 
the first breakdown, losing so many animals was quite a considerable shock. We 
expected … we weren’t naïve enough to think you’d never get it but we thought that if 
you did get it you’d start off with maybe one or two reactors … that seems to be the 
way that most people do it but we lost 30 odd, you know, 22 reactors and 11 incons on 
the first. So after we had the second test and we lost another lot by that stage we’d 
pretty well made up our mind. We went on the proviso that we weren’t sure that we’d 
be able to sell the rest of the herd because obviously we were under … so we decided to 
see whether it was possible to sell the rest of the herd, whether anybody would be 
interested in them under restriction and what ever but it turned out that somebody in 
the same situation as us who’d lost quite a lot, he was looking for more cows and he 
was prepared to buy them so we decided to. It sort of pushed us into the decision 
probably a few years earlier than we would have taken it.” (Interviewee TB2) 
In other cases, business strategies have been to develop or consider new 
enterprises to ensure that the business is more resilient any future bTB breakdown. 
Some of these are agricultural. For example, while under restriction TB7 shot the  
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male dairy calves, as they were unable to sell them. The stress of this process 
became emotionally difficult to tolerate and “my husband came in one day and said I 
can not shoot another animal.” Consequently, the decision was taken to begin a 
barley beef enterprise instead. Other business strategies to make the farm more 
resilient from bTB have been to diversify the income base of the household: TB6 
indentified the possibility of a wind turbine to bring additional income:  
“[Wife] Yeah we will be diversifying into something else. [Husband] We already have. 
[Wife] Yeah, we probably going to do a wind turbine because the grant money is there, 
Because it’s nothing to do with … it can’t get affected by disease.” (Interviewee TB6) 
Even when a farm has been able to diversify, being under bTB restrictions may 
reduce the scope of the diversification that can take place. As this dialogue between 
a husband and wife farming partnership demonstrates, selling the dairy herd under 
bTB restrictions may have had a limiting effect: 
 “[Husband] No it has never stopped us diversifying because we had TB has it … 
[Wife] Well if you’d sold the herd and the quota and had the money you might have 
diversified. [Husband] Yeah, we might have done then. [Wife] It’s all ifs and buts. 
[Husband] Yes that was all to do with timing you see. I mean if milk prices had 
maintained its value when we sold the herd and we’d had a stack of money higher than 
the house the yeah we would have … if we hadn’t had TB we would have … had a huge 
chunk of money, a much bigger chunk of money to have done something with.” 
(Interviewee TB1) 
The longer terms effects of farming under bTB restrictions are difficult to quantify 
accurately since business decisions are undertaken for a variety of reasons. While 
the disease may be a considerable influence, it is unlikely to be the only factor in the 
equation. Nevertheless, as the examples above have demonstrated, bTB frequently 
influences decision-making and in some instances acts as a ‘tipping point’ which 
precipitates change in the business.  
6. Compensation payments, insurance claims and the total cost of bTB 
6.1 Compensation payments  
In February 2006, the present bTB compensation scheme was introduced, which is 
derived from sale data obtained from store markets, prime markets, rearing calf 
sales, breeding sales and dispersal sales in Great Britain, rather than individual 
animal valuations. Therefore, the compensation tables reflect past prices. In the case 
of non-pedigree animals, the prices are those over the recent past (approximately 
between two and six weeks before the monthly table is issued). The pedigree charts 
are however, over a longer period reflecting the prices paid over a period of six 
months before the monthly chart is issued. Figure 11 illustrates the trends in values 
for four of the compensation table categories: for both beef and dairy, calved cow 
(commercial) and calved 36 month (pedigree).   
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Figure 11: The value of Government compensation for bTB slaughtered animals 























































Dairy Female - Calved Non-pedigree Dairy Female - Calved Pedigree Beef Non-pedigree Beef Pedigree  
Source: Defra (2010c) 
The charts provide open and transparent values for cattle destroyed because of bTB, 
giving a farmer the knowledge of how much he or she is likely to receive. However, 
the values do not account for better than average quality of livestock or the loss of 
pedigree bloodlines. One farmer, not interviewed as part of the survey, provided data 
on compensation values illustrate the disparity between compensation rates and the 
value of livestock (see Table 16). The market or sale value of cattle will depend on a 
combination of circumstances including the quality and number of the cattle being 
sold, the prospective buyers, the location of the market or sale, and the time of year 
the cattle are sold, particularly for store cattle from upland farms.  
As an example, at a recent sale at Sedgemoor Auction Centre 101 dairy cattle went 
under the hammer and the maximum price paid for a first quality dairy heifer was 
£2000. However, second quality dairy heifers made as little as £680. Similarly, the 
best quality dairy cow sold for £1840, whereas the minimum value paid for a second 
quality cow was £530. This illustration demonstrates the wide range of values that 
can be realised on a sale day. The difficulty of using the valuation chart based 
system is that it does not account for the margins of variability. Farmers that breed 
and manage high value stock (whether these are pedigree or not) are likely to be 
under compensated, whereas farmers with cattle perceived in the market place to be 
of lower than average quality) expressed in terms of price) are likely to be over 
compensated.   
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Table 16: Reported disparity between bTB chart valuation and market values for a 
large dairy farm 
Date No. 
killed 








Feb-10  4  Beef  M  Commercial  18-24m NA  £609 £935 -£326 -£1,304 
Apr-06  3 Beef         Lost  value  and  disposal  -£2,400 
Feb-07  2 Beef         Lost  value  and  disposal  -£1,600 
May-07  3 Beef         Lost  value  and  disposal  -£2,400 
Nov-07  1  Beef              Lost value and disposal  -£800 
Apr-06 1  Dairy  F  Commercial  12m  N £580 £580 £0  £0 
Mar-06  15  Dairy  F  Commercial  16-20m Y £358 £677 -£319 -£4,780 
Mar-06  6  Dairy  F  Commercial  16-20m N £358 £600 -£242 -£1,452 
Apr-07 2  Dairy  F  Commercial  16-20m N £397 £650 -£253 -£506 
Apr-06 2  Dairy  F  Commercial  20m  Y £595 £800 -£205 -£410 
Apr-07 4  Dairy  F  Commercial  20m  Y  £613 £1,000  -£387 -£1,548 
Apr-06 1  Dairy  F  Commercial  24m  Y £595 £850 -£255 -£255 
May-06  1  Dairy  F  Commercial  24m  Y £598 £950 -£352 -£352 
Jun-07 1  Dairy  F Commercial  24m  Y  £610 £1,400  -£790 -£790 
Feb-10 2  Dairy  F Commercial  24m  Y  £849  £2,000  -£1,151  -£2,302 
Nov-07 6  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,045  £1,838  -£793  -£4,758 
Jan-08 5  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,284  £2,000  -£716 -£3,580 
Mar-08 7  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,225  £2,000  -£775 -£5,425 
Mar-08 4  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  N  £1,225  £1,400  -£175 -£700 
Mar-08 1  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  N  £1,225  £2,000  -£775 -£775 
Nov-08 1  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y      £0  £0 
Jan-09 1  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,292  £2,000  -£708 -£708 
Jan-09 1  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,292  £2,000  -£708 -£708 
Jan-09 16 Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y/N  £1,292  £2,000  -£708 -£11,328 
Nov-09 14 Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y/N  £1,401  £2,000  -£599  -£8,386 
Dec-09 1  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y      £0  £0 
Jan-10 4  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,559  £2,200  -£641 -£2,564 
Jan-10 5  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,559  £2,200  -£641 -£3,205 
Jan-10 4  Dairy  F Commercial  Adult  Y  £1,559  £2,200  -£641 -£2,564 
Jun-08  4 Dairy  F  Pedigree 3-4m  N £1,669  £1,500  £169 £676 
Mar-06 1  Dairy  F Pedigree  18m  N  £889  £1,350  -£461 -£461 
Apr-07 2  Dairy  F  Pedigree  18m  Y  £813 £1,400  -£587 -£1,174 
Nov-06 1  Dairy  F Pedigree  20m Y  £857  £1,400  -£543  -£543 
May-06 1  Dairy  F Pedigree  24m Y  £948  £1,400  -£452  -£452 
Jun-07 1  Dairy  F Pedigree  24m  Y  £947 £1,750  -£803 -£803 
Feb-10 5  Dairy  F Pedigree  24m  Y  £1,381  £2,750  -£1,369  -£6,845 
Nov-07 8  Dairy  F Pedigree  Adult  Y  £1,125  £2,000  -£875  -£7,000 
Mar-08 9  Dairy  F Pedigree  Adult  Y  £1,437  £2,200  -£763 -£6,867 
May-08 1  Dairy  F Pedigree  Adult  Y  £1,361  £2,200  -£839  -£839 
Jun-08 1  Dairy  F Pedigree  Adult  Y  £1,614  £2,400  -£786 -£786 
Total                   -£90,694 
Six of the eight farms provided data regarding the compensation values that they 
had received over recent bTB breakdowns (see Table 17).
11 Absolute values clearly 
reflect the number of cattle slaughtered while the mean value is related to age and 
the type of cattle compensated. While the figures in Table 17 are illustrative, of more 
                                                 
11 The two farms, which did not supply data on compensation, were not able to at the time of the interview. Later when 
pursued for the data, a change in the weather meant that farm management activities took priority.   
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interest are the perceived issues associated with the level of compensation 
payments particularly for pedigree cattle.  
Table 17: Compensation values on case study farms 
 No.  killed  Compensation 
Average payment per 
reactor 
TB2 55  £64,350  £1,170 
TB3*
† 12  £12,927  £1,077 
TB4 1  £1,494  £1,494 
TB5
† 105  £126,784  £1,207 
TB6 8  £11,352  £1,419 
TB8 6  £8,445  £1,408 
*Compensation over the previous twelve months 
†Some of the compensation payments are estimated because of insufficient information provided 
by farmers 
The compensation for pedigree dairy and beef is regarded as particularly poor 
as this farmer argues: 
“I’ve no idea how they work these tables out and it’s a con the way they work them out. 
Nobody knows how they are worked out. 
It’s a farce really all of it because there’s no point in calling them pedigree when non-
pedigree … you call them non-pedigree when they are pedigree because you get more 
money for non-pedigree cattle. So the only thing I’ll say about the compensation is that 
it’s inadequate and it’s farcical.” (Interviewee identity withheld) 
Another farmer recognises how the compensation tables for pedigree stock can 
under estimate the value of cattle.  
“Our problem is that we’re being paid an average price. If our stock were below 
average, we’d be making a benefit on that side. I don’t think it would be unfair to say 
that my stock are above average, considerably above average. Because they’re all beef 
calves … if I buy a calf in the market for a replacement they would generally recognise 
I’m double the average market price.” (Interviewee TB3) 
It is likely, that both these farmers have high value stock and are disadvantaged by a 
system that offers averaged market/sale prices for cattle slaughtered. Furthermore, 
since pedigree data is collected over a much longer period (over the previous six 
months), any short-term trends in prices become diluted. The dilemma for pedigree 
dairy farms is illustrated in Figure 12. This shows the difference in value between a 
calved pedigree cow and a calved non-pedigree cow and illustrates the trend 
towards a reduction in the differential between the two types of cattle. If 
compensation for a pedigree dairy cow is below its commercial counterpart then it is 
understandable that farmers see the system as ‘inadequate’ and ‘farcical’ given the 
time spent in breeding specific bloodlines to improve the quality (and value) of their 
animals and their production performance. A similar problem may exist for organic 
farmers. TB8 argued that the Government compensation tables under estimates the 
‘true value’ of organic cattle:   
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“There’s no, absolutely no acknowledgement of organic status [emphasis given by 
interviewee] so if you’ve got to buy organic dairy Shorthorns you’re talking about 
paying lots of money; you can’t get them. And there’s absolutely no acknowledgement 
of that and there should be. There should be an organic premium as there is for a 
pedigree. Because that’s just fact, you pay more for organic and they’re less readily 
available. And also, it takes no account, all they do is give you a very low market value 
and as my husband said when we first had to work on that table, ‘I’d like to know 
where this market is if you can buy your cattle so cheap. It’s not around here.’ 
(Interviewee TB8) 
Figure 12: Difference in value between a calved pedigree dairy cow and a calved 



















































































































Source: Defra (2010c) 
Evidence suggests that the chart-based compensation system currently operating 
fails to reflect the true perceived value of cattle regardless of whether these are 
pedigree, commercial or organic cattle. For producers of quality pedigree and 
commercial cattle, the low rate of compensation can lead to difficulty in finding the 
same calibre replacement stock.  
6.2 Insurance claims  
Six out of eight of the case study farms had insurance for bTB. For these farms, the 
value that claimed per cow ranged from £150 to £300. Furthermore, the excess limit 
on the number of cattle claimed for varies from having no exemption to an exemption 
on the first six animals of any claim. The differences accounted for the different risk 
factors that an underwriter places on a particular farm. Therefore, a lower value and 
high excess may reflect higher risk factors. Table 18 illustrates the claims that 
farmers have made during their last breakdown with the settlement values reflecting  
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these factors and the total number of animals on the claim. Only one insured farm 
did not claim on his losses as he argued: 
“It’s there if we have a major breakdown, that’s why I got it. Individual one or twos, I 
don’t actually claim for but if I had 20 cows go but then it will have to kick in.” 
(Interviewee TB4) 
Of the two farms that did not have insurance for bTB breakdowns, one argued that it 
was better to try to manage risks, but recognised that this is difficult against bTB. 
“Our premiums would be huge as we’re in a TB hotspot. Generally with insurance they 
like to insure you against things that are generally never going to happen so as long as 
you’ve take reasonable precautions to make sure they don’t happen and they make a 
margin on top of it as well. They have to cover their costs, their living. So generally 
insurances is, if well we’ve taken the view to try and manage it yourself but in this case 
it is a bit trick isn’t it? ” (Interviewee TB6) 
Table 18: Insurance claims for lost stock 
   Insured 
Claimed in last 
breakdown 
Value per cow  Present excess  Total value received 
TB1 Yes    £150  1st 2 animals exempt  (Not known) 
TB2 Yes    £150  1st 6 animals exempt  £8,250 
TB3 No        
TB4 Yes    £150    £0 (not claimed) 
TB5* Yes    £200  1st 2 animals exempt  £14,600 
TB6 No        
TB7* Yes    £300 None  £18,300 
TB8 Yes    £300  1st 2 animals exempt  £1,200 
*The total value received is estimated from other data given in the interview. 
6.3 Estimating the total cost of bTB to farms 
Table 19 estimates the total costs to the case study farms of a bTB breakdown. For 
some of these farms, these breakdowns are on going and therefore the cost of the 
breakdown is likely to increase. While it would have been ideal to only study farms 
that were not presently under movement bTB restrictions, this was not possible 
because of the limited number of initial contacts. Therefore, to enable some 
comparability between the case study farms, Table 19 not only presents the main 
costs but also illustrates the monthly losses. However, these should be considered a 
minimum since it is likely that not all costs have been captured, such as losses from 
increased mastitis, lameness or abortions.  
The total costs in our research range from £7,549 to £192,324. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to directly compare this research with that of Sheppard and Turner 
(2005) although Table 20 replicates their research findings.  
The monthly loss of a bTB breakdown ranges from £505 to nearly £3,184. Table 19 
also illustrates the average cost of bTB breakdown across the eight case study 
farms. Clearly, there are many different factors that account for the range in losses  
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including the type of farm, the scale of operation, restocking policy, area farmed, 
number of holdings away from the farmstead, the marketing of livestock and 
livestock produce and by how much this is restricted. In general, but not exclusively, 
dairy farms tend to accrue the greatest losses during a bTB breakdown. 
Furthermore, farms with pedigree cattle tend to incur higher losses, particularly if 
their stock value is above average. For example, the dairy herd of TB5 is in the top 
1% of its breed and therefore this farm has been penalised more heavily by the 
compensation tables that do not recognise the time and effort that goes into breeding 






Table 19: The total cost of bTB to the study farms 
  TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6 TB7 TB8  Average 
Costs of testing  £9,485  £1,778 £4,980 £2,964 £9,122 £1,710 £6,969 £2,623  £4,954 
Costs of movement restrictions  £0  £7,699 £3,539 £3,198 £55,477  £0  £11,190  £3,275  £10,547 
Restocking costs  £43 £561  £252  £0  £40,985  £7,943  £0  £0  £6,223 
Administrative costs  £329 £670 £280 £913 £621 £1,166  £317 £329  £578 
Milk production costs  £0  £68,600 £0  £0  £86,118 £14,542 £56,364 £7,963  £29,198 
Other costs  £5,724  £550 £24,709  £474 £0  £1,989  £14,755  £2,000  £6,275 
Total costs  £15,581 £79,858 £33,759 £7,549  £192,324  £27,351 £89,594 £16,189  £57,776 
Compensation  £0  £64,350 £12,927 £1,494  £126,784  £11,352 £0  £8,445  £28,169 
Insurance  £0 £8,250  £0 £0 £14,600  £0 £22,800  £1,200  £5,856 
Total Compensation & Insurance    £72,600 £12,927 £1,494  £141,384  £11,352 £22,800 £9,645  £38,886 
Total loss over breakdown    £7,258  £20,832 £6,055  £50,940 £15,999 £66,794 £6,544  £24,917 
Total monthly loss    £907 £2,083  £505 £3,184  £1,333  £3,036  £1,091  £1,734 
 
Table 20: Findings from Sheppard and Turner on the costs of bTB in 2005 on the impact on farm income of a bTB 
breakdown (p.24) 
Type of farm (number of farms)  Breakdown costs  Compensation  Net gain  Duration of breakdown 
Dairy farm (37)  £11,603 £19,302 £7,699  0.7  years 
Non-pedigree dairy farms (28)  £6,984 £8,506 £1,522 0.6  years 
Pedigree dairy farms (8)  £28,520 £57,884 £29,364 1.1  years 
Upland beef farms (8)  £8,186 £12,778  £4,592 0.9  years 
Lowland beef farms (13)  £2,757 £4,817 £2,226 0.7  years 
  Source: Sheppard and Turner (2005) 
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7. The social impacts of bTB on farming families and their communities 
The social impacts of bTB on farming families and their communities manifest 
themselves in many ways. In this research, the analysis of eight case study 
farms is likely to only touch on some of the difficulties that farming families 
face. Nevertheless, it does provide a window on to some of the key social 
impacts. In particular, the case studies exemplify the stress and upset that the 
disease can bring to the farming industry. For example, TB4 illustrates how 
with bTB the way a farm operates changes significantly, while TB7 highlights 
the additional workload that movement restrictions bring:  
“At the moment I’m clear of TB so I’m quite … I’m fine. It’s if you’re under 
restriction you are purely thinking TB. There’s no other … you can’t think of 
anything else. You can’t trade, trying to think of a way of getting out of the 
problem of TB. How you are going to try and manage the stock.” (Interviewee 
TB4). 
“[Husband] Well it’s the extra work load; the worry of where you’re going to 
find the money to feed the extra cattle and that sort of thing. The stress is 
bloody horrific. And trying to get round to doing them out all winter. We kept 
48 all winter and it was a bloody mess.” (Interviewee TB8) 
Alongside such management difficulties are the feelings of helplessness 
against the disease:  
“Everyday because you’re losing stock so management decisions are being 
made because of TB and not to manage the farm, so when you’ve got a chunk 
of animals taken out. All other disease we manage it, with TB we’re not 
allowed to. It’s mastitis, lameness, it’s all about prevention, you just don’t keep 
treating it; you manage the cause. Whereas with TB you just keep taking stock 
out; it’s an unmanaged disease which we can’t control.” (Interviewee TB5) 
“It’s very frustrating because it limits your ability to do things I suppose on the 
farm … It’s not like you can go out there and deal with the source put it that 
way. You are expected to stand there and let it ravage your business and 
nobody is doing anything. And I think that just makes you very angry.” 
(Interviewee TB6) 
Furthermore, watching cattle slaughtered as a ‘bystander’ is deeply upsetting 
for many farmers and their families, for whom breeding cattle is more than a 
business: 
 “Cattle breeding, pedigree breeding is bit of a … it’s more than a hobby … 
Yeah but it’s a gut feeling when you’re seeing good cattle go and you’re not 
able to do much about it; it hurts. When you see 18 good prime cattle being 
herded in the yard to be shot on the farm; it hurts.” (Interviewee TB3) 
“Yes, it’s made me miserable. It’s made me miserable; it’s made me wonder 
why we do it. And it’s made me very sad that we’ve lost these lovely animals. 
But it’s made me cross.” (Interviewee TB6)  
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“It obviously affected [his wife] because we’re a husband and wife partnership 
etc. and she had to deal with the same sort of things which … we both had to 
pick the cows out and send them off for slaughter or whatever. With regard to 
the girls is probably wasn’t as much as an impact on them because none of 
them actually work here and if they’d been younger I would have said it would 
have had more of an effect.” (Interviewee TB2) 
The strains and stress that this can place the farming family under can 
be considerable, particularly for the principal farmer:  
“It does affect us in that we’re a bit ratty really with ourselves. You know, I’m 
not nice to live with if I’m … a pre pre-movement test I’m not nice to live with. 
For .... I’m just worried with the consequences” (Interviewee TB4) 
“You can’t describe it. The main stress, the main person that is stressed is [her 
husband] and because he is stressed we’re all affected by it. We all hate it 
when anything happens to the animals.” (Interviewee TB8) 
“Yes it has because you’re not exactly in the best of moods.” (Interviewee 
TB5) 
Although the loss of cattle is understandably upsetting, some farmers 
adopt a more ‘philosophical’ approach. For example, TB7 recognise the 
strain that being under bTB puts on them personally but since 
members of the family have had their own personal health scares, they 
are less inward looking, suggesting that “there is always somebody 
worse off”. Whereas TB1, a farm that has been under bTB restrictions 
for much of the period between 2002 and 2010, understands the 
difficulties that some farmers have but personally tries not to be 
affected by the effects of the disease:  
“I don’t get anxious thinking there’s going to be masses of reactors or 
anything like that; I just take it as it comes. But I wouldn’t say you’ve got a 
cloud over you you’re … there was a time you were embarrassed to say ‘I’m 
under TB restrictions which you aren’t so proud of that for somebody who’s 
not. But you get used to it then obviously.” (Interviewee TB1) 
It is not only the farmer and his family that can feel the effects of bTB but also 
employees of the farm. TB1 had nothing but praise for his staff and the 
understanding that had prevailed over the long period that the farm had been 
under movement restrictions. However, TB5 noted how the disease had led to 
“low staff morale” since they had as much contact with the cattle as the farmer 
and this sentiment was echoed by TB3:  
“They [the employees] are involved with them as well and they’re not happy 
about it. How much sleep they lose at night I don’t know but it doesn’t help.” 
(Interviewee TB3)   
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The greatest social impact on employees occurred on TB2. As this farm gave 
up milk production to concentrate on heifer rearing, the farmer had no choice 
but to release two of his staff:  
“I disposed of two of the relief milkers and one guy that still helps me he’s 
obviously drastically slashed his income.” (Interviewee TB2) 
Finally, there was a mixed reaction from the case studies as to whether bTB 
affects the wider rural community. Most interviewees regarded the wider 
farming community to be supportive, although this was not universal with TB8 
reporting that suspicion amongst graziers of common land occurs if one or 
other of them go down with the disease. In the wider non-farming community, 
as might be expected given that they encounter the consequences of the 
disease relatively infrequently, there is less understanding, as TB2 highlights:  
“On the farming community, yes. One the wider community … the actual 
farming specific you know, the hands on that have to do the work and deal with 
the consequences then yes it does have a massive impact, you know we’re a 
rural community, village community, on the wider community probably no. 
There is a lot of sympathy for you or whatever but aside from that then no not 
really.” (Interviewee TB2) 
TB4 argued that understanding from the wider non-farming community only 
came if a farmer spoke with them and made them aware of the consequences 
of the disease. This point was powerfully illustrated by TB7 in relating a story 
about a television reporter that came on to her farm.  
“The TV people came out to one of our pens and like it or not, we called it, at 
the end of the day it was called ‘death row’ because that’s where they were. 
And of course this TV chap came out and he said [can I see some cows] I 
didn’t think about it and I said I’ll take them up to death row. And he [the TV 
reporter] said that I hadn’t thought about it like that. And I said, well if they’re 
in that pen now there’s only one way they’re going. Coz he walked up round 
and saw them and he had a hell of a job to do ... he had a hell of a job, he was 
breaking down and everything ... and the [the cows] did look in their prime 
and they were quiet and were coming up and licking him. He just couldn’t, he 
could not believe that these animals [would be slaughtered] and I said to him 
that most of them have got a calf inside them. And he said, they’re going to kill 
them! When she gets shot there’s only one thing that happen to that calf. And 
he said, what happens? Well it suffocates in the end because there’s no oxygen 
for them ... He said I can’t believe this and I said yes, this is what people don’t 
see.” (Interviewee TB7) 
The main emphasis of this report has been on the economic impact of bTB 
but as this section has shown, there is a range of wider impacts on the well-
being of farmers and their families. Some of these may have economic 
implications. They certainly illustrate the personal cost of coping with bTB.  
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8. Wider economic impacts of TB on the rural economy 
In order to understand some of the impacts of bTB on the wider economy, key 
individuals within organisations that support farm businesses were asked to 
comment on the implications of bTB for their organisation and the wider 
sector.  
8.1. An auctioneer’s perspective 
In general, the affect on this particular auctioneer’s business had been 
negative. The change from valuers’ estimates of cattle for compensation to 
the chart based system has resulted in an estimated annual loss of between 
£8,000 and £10,000 on his business. Under the old system, the cattle were 
valued prior to slaughter and, in some areas, this would employ two valuers. 
However, “stupid practices” by some valuers lead to this system being 
stopped. These valuers are alleged to have over-estimated the worth of the 
cattle. However, the auctioneer, while critical of his own industry’s practices, 
was also critical of the new system, citing how the chart system values paid to 
farmers tended to be less than an animals true value. For example, “the chart 
would value a calved heifer at £1,100 whereas the cost of replacement would 
be £1,500. It is only in this last month or so [April/May 2010] there has been 
convergence between the chart system and market values.” 
A further difficulty for the auctioneer’s business was that pre-movement 
testing had caused problems with special sales. Where previously sales of 
900-1000 cattle would occur at the market, since every animal is required to 
have a bTB test, this places stress on the animals. Therefore, instead of these 
large sales, farmers instead sell 100 per week as a measure to reduce their 
risk. This has led to uncertain income for the auctioneer since sales are 
spread across weeks rather than over a day.  
A further issue cited by the auctioneer was that of trust. One farmer that 
conducts a pre-movement test that proves negative may sell his animals 
through the market. If another test on a vendor’s farm a week or two after the 
sale results in a reactor, the previous sales are traced and buyers are 
informed of the test results. The buyer blames the market. This has resulted in 
lost clients because it is perceived that there is too much risk in buying at 
markets. Therefore, trade from outside the area where bTB is less prevalent 
has fallen, with fewer farmers from outside the area wanting the potential 
problems of buying cattle from bTB areas.  
While the problems of bTB have not directly led to market closures, it has 
been a contributory factor in some cases. In the South West, there has been a 
consolidation in livestock markets. For example, Chippenham Market was 
closed due to the council selling the land for development.
12 Yeovil market, on 
                                                 
12 Although the market closed in Chippenham, it was moved to Bristol but this market closed after the proprietor 
refused to sign a lease agreement.  
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the other hand, closed because of combination of Blue Tongue and difficulties 
caused by bTB. This means that farmers in these areas are required to travel 
further to market to sell the cattle (and other livestock).  
8.2. A vet’s perspective 
The veterinary practice derives 75% of its income from the treatment of farm 
animals. Since 50% of this revenue was from fees for bTB testing, 37.5% of 
total income is from this source. As such, the practice is able to support 16 to 
17 large animal vets. The vet freely acknowledged that his practice has 
benefited from the earned income but also admitted that given a choice, he 
would prefer to practice without bTB. Indeed, his frustration was clear: 
“You train to be a vet but end up spending half your time on mundane tasks 
focused around one disease.” 
However, the cost of this would be the loss of employment for half the large 
animal vets. Furthermore, should bTB be eradicated the ability to provide out 
of hours cover, particularly at night, would be compromised, thus reducing the 
level of service provided to farmers.  
Equally, the regime of testing for bTB also detracted from the level of service 
the veterinary practice offered. This was illustrated by two examples. The first 
regarded the employment of a vet solely employed to test cattle for bTB to 
enable other vets in the practice to reduce the days they spent on testing 
thereby enabling them to focus on other clinical work. The second regarded 
attempts to develop a mastitis control programme.  
“We sent a vet to develop the skills to develop a mastitis control programme 
and they came back full of enthusiasm and energy. But because of bTB 
pressures that person has only been to a very few farms in over a year. Instead, 
a farmer may phone up and say he has a high cell count and this is an 
opportunity to get involved and spend time with the farm and go in depth to 
understand why that herd has developed a mastitis problem. However, we say 
try this tube or that tube. The problem is that we are in a position of stable 
income [from bTB testing] but we are not out there generating new work”. 
8.3. An insurer’s perspective 
This insurer insures 70% of the farming community.  
Bovine TB has caused this insurer difficulties in terms of its loss ratio. Four to 
five years ago, the loss ratio was in excess of 200%. That is, for bTB claims, 
twice the income was being paid out to clients as was being collected in 
premiums. To rectify this situation, the insurer had a choice of raising the 
premium for all farmers or increasing the excess to farmers that had made 
previous claims for losses from bTB. The latter course of action was taken 
and the loss ratio has been reduced to 80-90% which, once expenses have  
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been taken into account, means that providing insurance against the 
incidence of bTB is still a loss making activity for the insurer.  
The number of claims for bTB however must be seen in context of this 
insurer’s business as a whole. Of the approximate 5,000 claims in the South 
West in 2009, half were for vehicle accidents, while the number of claims for 
bTB was much smaller in comparison. Therefore, the impact on the 130-140 
staff employed in the South West office of the insurer has been minimal.  
Initially, a farmer that has not had an outbreak of bTB will have some flexibility 
in the level of excess and compensation that he or she may wish to take out, 
and this will be reflected in the premium price. However, the level of cover will 
be assessed on a whole business basis rather than just insuring against bTB. 
If a farmer has already a number of claims for bTB, the insurer will assess the 
risks on a farm of further outbreaks of bTB and will offer the farmer insurance 
but with different conditions, such as different rates or a different excess policy 
such as cover over three or four animals with bTB. This prevents claims for 
one or two animals. It then becomes the choice of the farmer to weigh the 
premium against the risks. The insurer suggests that, in most cases, farmers 
are good risk managers, looking at the benefits of cover against the risks of 
incurring losses from bTB. However, it is important that a farmer understands 
the cover that is being offered and to be able to do this, it is necessary that 
insurer’s sale agents provide good advice.  
While a farmer may be a good risk manager, the insurer does concede that 
farmers are not always happy with the revised terms and conditions, and may 
see increased premiums or a greater excess imposed when making a new 
claim. However, the alternative of offering the same terms and conditions 
would increase premiums to farmers not affected by bTB. Therefore, in terms 
of fairness, it is inevitable that increased premiums or more stringent terms 
and conditions will occur for farms that have already claimed for bTB. A 
consequence of farmers’ dissatisfaction is that relationships between farmers 
and the insurers’ sales staff, particularly in areas where bTB hotspots occur 
may be difficult and stressful. 
8.4. An advisor’s perspective 
This individual is the managing director of an advisory firm that provides 
market research and advice to the dairy industry. The impact of bTB on his 
business was not significant but as it is a business providing information and 
guidance to dairy farmers it had influenced the advisory work that they do. In a 
positive manner, the business has been viewed as a reliable source of 




8.5. A summary of the impact of bTB on wider economy 
The perspectives offered by interviewees of businesses associated with 
agriculture that have experience of bTB suggest that the disease has had 
both costs but also has offered opportunities. However, where opportunities 
have arisen these are often identified as being in conflict with the wider 
aspirations of business development. For example, while the vets may benefit 
from increased trade they recognise that this is at the cost of developing 
better animal health programmes alongside farmers.  
In addition, knowledge from businesses in the wider economy support 
farmers’ experiences regarding difficulties in sourcing good quality livestock in 
the South West, the inadequacies of the compensation system in reflecting 
the different qualities of breeding stock, and the consequences of the disease 
on farm animal health programmes. The comments of the advisor echoed the 
problems that farmers have with compensation in particular:  
“The lack of effective action against the disease leaves farmers feeling very 
isolated and vulnerable. While financial compensation softens the blow it 
cannot lessen the devastating effect of losing generations of breeding.” 
(Advisor) 
This quote also reinforces the point that the cost of bTB to farmers needs to 
be seen beyond strict economic costs but also in terms personal costs to the 
farming family. 
9. Summary and Conclusions 
bTB continues to pose a significant challenge to dairy and beef farmers, 
particularly in South West England. In 2009 there were 7,449 herds subject to 
movement restrictions in Great Britain because of bTB. Of these, 52% 
occurred in South West England and 20% were in Devon alone. There is no 
simple solution to the control of the disease and the debate has become 
increasingly polarised and politicised (RELU, 2010). Leaving aside the 
discussion about causes and control, the research reported here presents a 
rich and detailed study of the costs of bTB on eight farms across the South 
West, supplemented by additional interviews with stakeholders from allied 
sectors. In order to assess the economic impact of bTB, costs (and income) 
have been divided into various categories including the cost of bTB testing; 
the cost of movement restrictions; costs of restocking; longer term costs, 
compensation and insurance payments; and personal and social costs to the 
farmer and his family. 
9.1 The economic cost of bTB at the farm level 
Analysis of the case study farms demonstrated that the cost differentiation 
between administering and reading the intradermal tuberculin (skin) test is 
minimal. The approximate cost per animal over each test and the breakdown  
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period varied considerably however. For example, the lowest was £1.36 and 
the highest was £6.10, although most were between £1.95 and £2.97 per 
animal. In terms of enterprises, there were no discernible differences between 
beef and dairy farms. However, there are also a range of indirect and often 
‘hidden’ costs associated with testing such as the knock-on impacts on other 
activities (e.g. delays to silage making), impacts on milk production (although 
not all farmers experience this), behavioural difficulties in cattle and additional 
fuel and other costs feed costs. Such costs are not covered by current 
compensation. 
In addition to the direct costs of testing, movement restrictions impose a range 
of additional costs. The costs of keeping additional stock on the farm accrue in 
additional costs in extra bedding, feed and labour to keep stock. The inability 
to move stock off-farm (or around a farm for those businesses composed of 
more than one holding) create a significantly increased work load and may be 
associated with problems of over-stocking and unintentional breaches of 
organic certification and cross-compliance regulations. As with the costs of 
testing, the costs of movement restrictions reflect the individual characteristics 
of particular farm business, the spatial configuration of the land holdings, the 
specific features of the farm enterprises, etc, suggesting that average figures 
can mask much of the complexity of cost assessment. 
The present bTB compensation scheme, introduced in February 2006, is 
derived from sale data obtained from store markets, prime markets, rearing 
calf sales, breeding sales and dispersal sales in Great Britain, rather than 
individual animal valuations. As such, farmers that breed and manage high 
value stock (whether these are pedigree or not) are likely to be under 
compensated, whereas farmers with cattle perceived in the market place to 
lower than average (as expressed in terms of price) are likely to be over 
compensated. Evidence from the case study farms suggested that the chart-
based compensation system currently operating fails to reflect the perceived 
value of cattle, regardless of whether these are pedigree, commercial or 
organic. One farmer described it as ‘inadequate’ and ‘farcical’ given the time 
spent in breeding specific bloodlines to improve the quality and value of 
animals and their production performance. Consequently, for producers of 
quality pedigree and commercial cattle, the low rate of compensation can lead 
to difficulty in finding the same calibre replacement stock.  
The costs associated with replacing stock also vary considerably, and the 
practicalities of replacing stock can have wider impacts on herd management 
and the farm business. The costs of sourcing replacement stock include 
labour time taken to source cattle, the cost of travelling to see stock, and the 
costs of haulage once the cattle are bought. Restocking a farm may in part 
depend on the amount of compensation received. There are however, also 
‘hidden’ costs. Due to the variability of compensation payments and the 
mismatch between compensation payments and market values, not all farms  
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can afford to replace all cattle slaughtered. In turn, this can be associated with 
a significant loss of revenue from reduced milk sales. Some farms have 
chosen to maintain a closed herd and breed their own replacements. Again, 
this can be associated with a significant loss of milk revenue.  
There are numerous longer-term costs of bTB that impact upon the farm 
business. Some are directly related to dealing with the demands of the 
disease, such as additional paperwork or financing biosecurity measures, 
while others are structural, including the extension of overdrafts or the 
postponement of capital investment for farm development. However, the 
longer terms effects of farming under bTB restrictions are difficult to quantify 
accurately since business decisions are undertaken for a variety of reasons. 
While the disease may a considerable influence, it is unlikely to be the only 
factor in the equation. Nevertheless, this report demonstrates that bTB 
frequently influences decision-making and in some instances acts as a ‘tipping 
point’ which precipitates change in the business. 
9.2 The total economic cost of bTB on case study farms 
The monthly loss of a bTB breakdown amongst the case study farms ranges 
from just under £505 to nearly £3,184. Clearly, this is influenced by a number 
of factors (see below), including the number of animals involved. These costs 
are likely to be an underestimate due to undisclosed and unquantified costs. 
Many different factors that account for the range in losses including the type 
of farm, the scale of operation, restocking policy, area farmed, number of 
holdings away from the farmstead, the marketing of livestock and livestock 
produce and by how much this is restricted. In general, but not exclusively, 
dairy farms tend to accrue the greatest losses during a bTB breakdown. 
Farms with pedigree cattle also tend to incur high losses, particularly if their 
stock is above average in terms of quality (as expressed by market prices). 
9.3 Personal and social costs 
Although the focus of this study has been on economic impacts, it has 
illustrated the stress and upset that the disease can bring to the farming 
industry through illuminating how bTB can impact on the way a farm operates 
and the additional workload that movement restrictions bring. In addition, 
interviewees have expressed feelings of helplessness in the management of 
the disease, with farmers feeling like ‘bystanders’, which is deeply upsetting 
for many farmers and their families, for whom breeding cattle is more than just 
a business.  
9.4 The impact of bTB on wider economy 
The perspectives offered by interviewees from businesses associated with 
agriculture that have experience of bTB suggest that the diseases has had 
costs but has also offered opportunities. However, where opportunities have  
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arisen, these are often identified as being in conflict with the wider aspirations 
of business development. For example, while the vets may benefit from 
increased trade they recognise that this is at the cost of developing better 
animal health programmes alongside farmers. In addition, knowledge from 
businesses in the wider economy support farmers’ experiences regarding 
difficulties in sourcing good quality livestock in the South West, the 
inadequacies of the compensation system, and the consequences of the 
disease on farm animal health programmes. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Given the limited number of farms studied, it is not appropriate to extrapolate 
the costs identified to all farms with bTB in the region. The case study 
approach employed in this research provides detailed qualitative analysis and 
quantitative data about the farms surveyed. In doing so it highlights the 
variability in costs and compensation that average figures often obscure. 
However, the analysis does have its limitations and to be able to estimate total 
costs to farmers across the South West of England would require a much 
larger survey, which was beyond the resources of this project.  
Leaving aside the heated debate about appropriate means for controlling the 
incidence and geographical spread of bTB, this report has shown that current 
compensation payments tend not to fully compensate farmers for their direct 
and indirect economic losses. The research undertaken for this report has 
revealed considerable variation across a range of different types of costs 
associated with bTB. Consequently average figures, either for costs or 
calculating compensation, obscure much of the detail at an individual farm 
level. The research also points to a range of ‘hidden’ and longer term costs 
that fall beyond the scope of the compensation scheme. Finally, in addition to 
economic losses, bTB is imposing considerable costs on the personal well-






ABC (2009). The Agricultural Budgeting and Costing Book (68
th Edition) ABC, Melton 
Mowbray. 
Callwood, S. (2006). Identifying the Cost of Unpaid Family Labour on Cattle and Sheep 
Farms. Promar International, Tarporley, Cheshire. 
Defra (2010a). Breakdown of bovine TB expenditure from the England bTB Programme 
budget. Defra, London. 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/atoz/tb/documents/ expenditure-
stats.pdf 
Defra (2010b). Detailed TB statistics. Defra, London. 




Gerring, J. (2007) Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Ilbery, B. and Maye, D. (2010a) Agricultural restructuring and changing food networks in the 
UK. In: Coe, N. and Jones, A. (eds) Reading the economy: the UK in the 21st century. Sage, 
London, forthcoming. 
Ilbery, B. and Maye, D. (2010b) Clustering and the spatial distribution of organic farming in 
England and Wales, Area DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4762.2010.00953.x. 
Ilbery, B., Holloway L., and Arber, R. (1999) The Geography of Organic Farming in England 
and Wales in the 1990s. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 90, 285–295 
Ilbery, B., Maye, D., Watts, D. and Holloway, L. (2010) Property matters. Agricultural 
restructuring and changing landlord-tenant relationships in England. Geoforum, 41, 423-434. 
RABDF (2008). Identifying the True Costs of Farmers Own Labour. Royal Association of 
British Dairy Farmers, Kenilworth, Warwickshire. 
RELU (2010) Bovine tuberculosis: a problem for farmers, conservationists and policymakers. 
RELU Policy and Practice Note 19. 
Sheppard, A. and Turner, M. (2005). An Economic Impact Assessment of Bovine 
Tuberculosis in South West England, Centre for Rural Research, University of Exeter. 
 
  
 
  58
 
 